Global trade routes are vital in our interconnected world. Yet, they face significant challenges from regional conflicts, economic crises, and funding uncertainties. Importantly, the shift from a US-led unipolar world to a multipolar one could also give rise to threats to global commerce.
In this new landscape, developing economies with ambitious foreign policy agendas—often labelled as middle powers—are forging new alliances and seeking new avenues to navigate the fog of uncertainty. While some Western experts dismiss these latest trends as “exaggerated panic”, the reality tells a different story.
BRICS is expanding, and US partners, such as the Gulf nations, are inking long-term business contracts with China while still buying expensive military hardware from Washington. Meanwhile, despite facing Western sanctions, Russia stayed afloat partly thanks to China, which benefited the most from this situation.
Within this tumultuous landscape, global trade routes become critical lifelines, enabling countries—major powers and middle powers alike—to challenge the monopoly of Western-dominated power structures over global trade.
China’s vast Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a case in point. This multi-billion-dollar project encompasses six major trade routes, which extend from mainland China to Europe via Central Asia and the Caucasus, to the Gulf through Pakistan, and Southeast Asia from its southern borders. With this extensive network, China is solidifying its influence in global trade through a route diversification strategy that protects its economic future from sanctions, like those imposed on Russia and mitigates risks associated with the “Malacca Dilemma”. However, these routes are not completely risk-free. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the BRI’s flagship project, faces significant terrorist threats, particularly around the Gwadar Port construction site.
Another connectivity alternative is the 7,200 km-long International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), linking Indian ports to Iran, across the Caspian Sea, and finally to Russia. Although Tehran and Moscow, two despised actors in the eyes of the US, are entangled in sanctions, New Delhi is pushing for this route, bargaining with Washington over other dossiers to get this partnership going. Its recent deal securing operational rights for Iran’s Chabahar Port underscores this. For Russia, this corridor represents a vital lifeline to circumvent sanctions. Iran, too, sees this route as a crucial escape from economic restrictions.
On the other hand, the US-backed IMEC project envisions a bold new trade route starting from India, moving to UAE ports, then via rail and road to Saudi Arabia, through Jordan to Israeli ports, and finally reaching European markets via the Mediterranean. Though still mostly on the conceptual stage, this initiative aims to divert maritime transport from the Red Sea, where Houthi attacks have spiked risk premiums. Despite being affected by Israel’s War on Gaza, some movement is taking place. India and the UAE inked a deal, and France appointed a special envoy for the project.
The Development Road Project, borne out of Türkiye and Iraq’s collaboration, is a striking example of the surge in interconnectivity initiatives. Starting from the Al Faw Port in the Persian Gulf, this route will go through rail and road networks, reaching European markets. Qatar and the UAE joined the project during President Erdoğan’s visit to Iraq, adding further momentum to this endeavour. Ankara’s proactive anti-terrorist stance, marked by robust cross-border operations in Northern Iraq, underscores the strategic importance and determination behind this venture.
The aforementioned trade corridors not only indicate the rise in global interconnectedness but also signal the shift towards multipolarity and a departure from a US-led international architecture controlling global commerce.
The new situation allows countries to adopt a multi-aligned actor behaviour. For example, the US, in its strategy of competition with China, needs allies like India. Hence, India was rewarded with the IMEC starting route. However, India does not unquestioningly join such anti-China projects but also develops alliances with Russia and Iran. Similarly, the UAE takes part in the competition between the US and China but opts to be part of other alternatives, such as the Development Road Project. Türkiye, outside the scope of IMEC, forges its alternative with its neighbours while expanding its counter-terrorism campaign.
This environment is conducive to multi-alignment and gives a breathing space to countries confined to strictly following one camp or the other. As exemplified by the UAE, a middle power can invest in critical routes favoured by Washington while also signing multi-billion-dollar investment deals with actors like China or joining blocs like BRICS. Long-time American partners like Saudi Arabia and the UAE are wooed by BRICS, which also includes their arch-enemy, Iran. The game and its rules are changing. So, new scenarios arise, and previous arrangements dissolve.
Two scenarios may impact the future of global corridor competition. The first one could lead to “corridor wars” due to heightened competition, prompting countries to reassess their partnerships and potentially decouple from China in the long term. While possible, this outcome isn’t the most likely. As Professor Kerry Brown underscores in his book, there’s often a delayed response, making strategies like positioning IMEC as a counter-BRI potentially counterproductive for Washington. Brown asserts, “In countering China, whether in the security, economic or diplomatic fields, the story is the same: we are always five to ten years too late.”
The second scenario could result in a heightened competition between corridors, which, in turn, leads to more complex interdependence. This vision encompasses a wide array of products flowing through trade routes, ranging from raw materials and energy to high-tech goods, each supported by distinct global production nodes. This interconnected network of corridors could significantly elevate the strategic significance of middle-power nations, potentially laying the stones of a multipolar international system.
Setting aside the potential for competition or engagement that these two scenarios might incite, one undeniable truth stands out: in today’s global landscape, examining how so-called middle powers integrate into regional connectivity networks offers invaluable insights. Nations, driven by the desire to maximize their national, economic, or long-term geopolitical interests, are not shy about crafting a Plan B for the future of global power dynamics—India being a prime example. Such moves occasionally nudge Washington into adopting a more cautious stance on sanctions, as seen when New Delhi partnered with Tehran for the Chabahar Port operations. Consequently, the keen interest in trade corridors and strategic connectivity checkpoints serves as a powerful lens through which to discern the evolving contours of the international power structure.
Indeed, multipolarity is becoming more of a reality rather than an exaggeration of the future.
This article originally appeared in the opinion section of the South China Morning Post.
