Gold, Militias, and War: Sudan’s Complex Path to Peace

A civil war erupted in Sudan on 15 April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) headed by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (also known as Hemedti). The conflict has been centred in Khartoum and the Darfur region, where the Masalit massacres have led to widespread reports of ethnic cleansing or genocide. The humanitarian crisis has reached alarming levels, with nearly 25 million people facing extreme hunger. On 7 January 2025, the United States declared that the RSF and allied militias had committed genocide.

The Rise of the RSF

Sudan’s ongoing civil war is deeply rooted in the legacy of the Janjaweed. In the early 2000s, ethnic tensions and disputes over resources led to a rebellion in Darfur. President Omar al-Bashir responded with force, but struggling to suppress the uprising, he turned to the Janjaweed militias from camel-trading tribes in Darfur and Chad. These militias committed severe war crimes to crush the rebellion, resulting in 300,000 deaths and the displacement of 2.7 million people. Several Janjaweed leaders were subsequently indicted by the ICC for genocide and crimes against humanity.

In 2013, al-Bashir restructured the Janjaweed into the RSF, placing them under the command of Hemedti. The RSF gained international prominence in 2015 when they were deployed to Yemen alongside Saudi and Emirati forces. That same year, the RSF was officially recognised as a “regular force,” and in 2017, a law granted it the status of an independent security entity. Meanwhile, Hemedti’s wealth grew through gold mines granted by al-Bashir. Tensions between the RSF and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) emerged after the removal of al-Bashir in 2019, particularly regarding the integration of forces during Sudan’s political transition.

Since April 15,  2023, the country is being ripped apart in a civil war between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), the country’s official army, headed by General Abdul Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), headed by Hemedti. Each party in this conflict is backed by various regional and international powers.

More than 150,000 people have been killed in Sudan since then, and nearly 13 million people (almost a quarter of Sudan’s population) have been forcibly displaced, creating a refugee crisis of staggering proportions. The conflict has systematically dismantled food production capabilities, agricultural infrastructure, and basic social services, pushing the country to the brink of total collapse.

Multiple international mediation efforts have sought to end Sudan’s civil war, but none have been successful. The involvement of foreign powers seeking to gain influence and access to the country’s resources has further complicated the conflict resolution.

Gold and War Economies

Sudan is a significant producer of gold in the world. The World Gold Council reported that in 2023, Sudan ranked as the 16th largest gold producer worldwide. It comes fourth in gold production in Africa, after Ghana, Mali, and South Africa.

Gold has played a significant role in fuelling the Sudanese conflict. Reportedly, the RSF is more heavily involved in the gold trade, but both sides have been smuggling and selling vast amounts of gold to fund their military operations. According to a report, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) plays a key role in the gold smuggling operations connected to Sudan’s ongoing conflict.

According to a Foreign Affairs article, the warring factions in Sudan rely heavily on the procurement and sale of illicit gold to fund their weapons purchases, a significant factor given that gold constitutes 70 percent of Sudan’s exports. Despite this, the UAE imported $1 billion worth of Sudanese gold in 2023.

The warring parties leverage these networks to exchange gold for weapons, vehicles, and other war supplies. Ultimately, the continued access to gold revenues and associated smuggling routes is sustaining both sides’ ability to wage war, making it a critical factor in the conflict’s persistence.

The Beginning of the End?

In March 2025, forces loyal to SAF, took control of the capital Khartoum, nearly two years after losing the capital to the RSF.  This development is not only a military victory for the SAF but also strengthens its legitimacy and international recognition.

However, RSF continues to control vast territories in western Sudan’s Darfur and Kordofan regions. These areas have seen mass killings, ethnic targeting and sexual violence by RSF and allied militias.

Recently, the RSF launched a barrage of suicide drones at Port Sudan, the army’s de facto wartime capital on the Red Sea. One key strategy behind this, particularly for the RSF, appears to be the use of drones to render large parts of the country ungovernable and to further undermine the SAF’s ability to present itself as the legitimate and internationally recognised authority in the country.

Long-Term Security Issues

Sudan’s security apparatus is deeply fractured, with numerous militias and paramilitary groups operating independently across the country. These forces have long functioned without meaningful accountability to the public something that would be expected in a functioning, democratic, and institutionalised state. This lack of oversight and cohesion has allowed tensions between rival groups to surface, ultimately fuelling the current conflict.

One of the main obstacles is how to integrate the RSF and other militia fighters into the broader army. This has been a common issue in conflict-affected countries, including Libya. These militia groups often refuse to integrate into the national army to further entrench themselves in the economy and political sphere.

Ultimately, Sudan’s future depends on overcoming its deep-rooted divisions, establishing a unified security framework, and securing international support for reconstruction and stability. Recently, Sudanese and international NGOs have called on President Trump to end the war, while Sudan brought a case against the UAE in front of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), accusing it of being complicit in acts of genocide against the Masalit community in West Darfur by backing the RSF militias.

Moving forward, the path to peace requires not only international involvement but also a genuine commitment to reconciliation and addressing the underlying causes of Sudan’s crisis. Given the current situation, Sudan remains a long way from achieving lasting stability.

APA

MLA

Chicago

Ferhat Polat
Ferhat Polat
Ferhat Polat is a Chevening Scholar from the 2022 cohort and a researcher at the TRT World Research Centre. Holding an MA in Middle East Studies from the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies at the University of Exeter, he specializes in North African geopolitics and security, with a particular focus on Libya. Polat is often invited as a commentator on news channels and has contributed numerous essays and articles on geopolitical issues that have been published in various journals, newspapers, and digital outlets.

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