Abdullah Ocalan, the founding leader of the PKK—a group designated as a terrorist organisation by Türkiye and outlawed by numerous countries—issued a groundbreaking declaration on 27 February 2025, calling for the group to “lay down arms” and “dissolve” itself.
This unprecedented statement could mark a pivotal moment in Türkiye’s decades-long fight with the PKK, which has been responsible for armed confrontations and security threats for over four decades. The PKK launched its first attacks on Turkish security forces in Siirt and Hakkari in August 1984, leading to prolonged violence that has claimed over 50,000 lives, imposed immense economic burdens, and left deep societal scars. This conflict has extended beyond Türkiye, spilling into Iraq, Syria, and other parts of the Middle East, exacerbating geopolitical tensions and contributing to regional instability.
The Long but Inevitable Decline of the PKK
Ocalan’s message—directly addressing the PKK and its affiliates and aligning with Türkiye’s long-standing demands—underscores the inevitability of the group’s dissolution. This development was not incidental but rather the result of domestic and regional shifts that have rendered the PKK increasingly irrelevant. Indeed, in the statement, Ocalan emphasised that the group has lost its historical, sociological, and ideological significance, making its disbandment a logical outcome.
Domestically, Türkiye’s relentless military and intelligence operations against the PKK—both within its borders and across northern Iraq—have significantly weakened the group militarily and politically. These efforts have been complemented by strategic political manoeuvres that have isolated the PKK from potential allies.
Regionally, shifting dynamics in Syria and Iraq have also compounded the group’s vulnerabilities. In Syria, where the PKK-affiliated PYD/YPG sought to establish an autonomous entity, the new Syrian government has adopted a firm stance prioritising territorial integrity after Bashar al Assad’s overthrow. The new government has signalled its intent to centralise military authority under its official armed forces, leaving no room for independent armed factions like the PYD/YPG. Similarly, Iraq’s new central government has strengthened ties with Türkiye to counter the PKK’s presence, recognising that its activities threaten Iraq’s stability. Further, the KDP, which wields significant influence in Iraq’s Kurdish Autonomous Region, has also exerted pressure on the PKK to abandon armed conflict. This increasing isolation has severely limited the organisation’s choices.
On a broader level, Russia’s recent stance against separatist movements in Syria—specifically targeting the PYD/YPG—along with uncertainties surrounding U.S. policy following Donald Trump’s return to power, have further weakened confidence among PKK operatives. Washington’s unpredictable stance on Syria has undermined trust within these factions, leaving them exposed to military and political pressures from Ankara and Damascus alike.
Caught between a rock and a hard place, the PKK now finds itself in a situation where Ocalan’s call for disarmament and dissolution is not only inevitable but also a strategically necessary move.
Repercussions on the PYD/YPG: A Blow to Separatist Ambitions
Ocalan’s appeal carries profound ramifications for the PYD/YPG, the PKK’s Syrian affiliate, which has long pursued the establishment of an autonomous “terror state” in northeastern Syria.
Despite efforts by the PYD/YPG leadership to distance themselves from Ocalan’s call, it is evident that his message targets all branches of the PKK across Syria, Iraq, and Iran. In this regard, by directly declining autonomy—a cornerstone of the PYD/YPG agenda—Ocalan has struck at the heart of their separatist ambitions.
The PYD/YPG now faces mounting pressure from both Ankara and Damascus. Both governments have made it clear that continued resistance to integration into Syria’s national military structure will result in severe backlashes. Damascus has emphasised that armed groups operating outside state authority will not be tolerated. This leaves the PYD/YPG with limited options: either dissolve and integrate into Syria’s military or face potential military action from both Turkish and Syrian forces.
Ocalan’s statement further makes ongoing negotiations between PYD/YPG and Damascus over control of northeastern Syria and their future role in a unified Syrian state meaningful. The group is now at a critical juncture. Ignoring the call would isolate them further and likely lead to intensified military campaigns from both Ankara and Damascus—accelerating their decline. Both governments have shown readiness to pursue military solutions should political avenues fail.
Moreover, Ocalan’s message disrupts PYD/YPG’s broader strategy of leveraging geopolitical shifts to sustain their separatist docket. For years, they relied on external support—primarily from the United States—to bolster their position in northeastern Syria. However, Ocalan’s call exposes this reliance as fragile by signalling that even within PKK leadership, there is recognition of the armed struggle’s futility. This internal critique weakens PYD/YPG’s legitimacy and places additional pressure on its leadership to reconsider its approach.
Ultimately, his appeal forces groups like the PYD/YPG to confront an existential question: whether to adapt to changing geopolitical realities or risk annihilation. Failing to seize this opportunity for a peaceful resolution would be a grave strategic error, as Ankara and Damascus remain prepared to employ decisive measures if necessary.
Ankara Prioritises Actions Over Words
While Ocalan’s statement represents a significant step toward resolving Türkiye’s 40-year struggle with terrorism, Ankara remains measured in its response.
The Turkish government has consistently emphasised that declarations alone are insufficient; tangible actions are required for meaningful progress. While the call opens a pathway for resolution, Türkiye’s leadership is clear that actual disarmament and dissolution of PKK-affiliated elements—including PYD/YPG—is non-negotiable. Any failure in compliance will leave military options firmly on the table.
Ankara’s cautious stance reflects its broader strategy of combining military strength with calculated political manoeuvring—a dual approach instrumental in weakening the PKK both domestically and regionally. Ocalan’s call, made without preconditions or concessions, further strengthens Ankara’s position by allowing it to dictate terms and maintain control over this process.
This pragmatic approach is also echoed by Damascus, which faces similar challenges with separatist movements within its borders. Syrian authorities prefer dialogue as an initial step but have made it clear that continued resistance by armed groups will be met with decisive force if necessary. This alignment between Ankara and Damascus underscores a shared understanding: while peaceful resolutions are preferable, military solutions remain viable if separatist factions refuse disarmament.
Türkiye’s insistence on concrete actions also highlights its deep apprehensions regarding external actors that have historically exploited separatist movements to destabilise the region. By maintaining a resolute stance, Ankara aims to prevent any resurgence of terrorism that could jeopardise national security or regional stability. Acknowledging that these separatist groups often serve as proxies for foreign powers, Türkiye is determined to render such entities ineffective by ensuring their complete disarmament and dissolution.
A Catalyst for Regional Stability
Finally, resolving the PKK conflict would not only bring stability beyond Türkiye but also serve to foster broader regional security.
Domestically, lifting the state of emergency in conflict-affected areas could accelerate development projects and attract much-needed investments, revitalising Türkiye’s southeastern provinces. Politically, if this process bears fruit, President Erdoğan and MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli would be credited with ending one of the longest armed insurgencies in modern history, bolstering their popularity.
Externally, the disarmament and dissolution of separatist groups like PKK/PYD/YPG would strip external actors—most recently the United States and Israel—of key tools used to destabilise the region through proxy forces.
For instance, Israel has leveraged PYD/YPG’s autonomy ambitions to undermine Syrian territorial integrity while advancing broader regional goals. Neutralising such groups would weaken Tel Aviv’s ability to exploit divisions for strategic gain while reducing external interference.
Addressing separatist terrorism would counter external interference while delivering significant humanitarian and economic benefits. Ending decades of violence would save lives, free up resources for reconstruction, and foster economic growth.
A Middle East free from insurgencies could enhance regional cooperation on security, economic development, and refugee crises, enabling stronger diplomatic ties and collective action.
Ultimately, this historic moment marks potentially both an end and a fresh start—for Türkiye, Syria, and a region that has long sought peace after decades of conflict.
