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Question 1:

What implications arise from Türkiye's approval of Finland and Sweden's accession to NATO? How will these developments impact the future relations between Türkiye, Sweden, and Finland?

Me spending quite some time in Stockholm and Sweden both for professional as well as private reasons it allows for a better understanding of how both decision makers and 'ordinary citizens' view the Republic of Türkiye and the on-going NATO accession process. Answering your second part of the question first, and from what I hear on and off the record, Ankara's 'yes' to eventual Swedish accession to NATO are very much welcomed. The same holds forth for Helsinki. A process has started in Stockholm including the former Foreign Minister Ann Linde who recently admitted the PKK receives financial support from Sweden; of course, not implying from the government but from illegal money launderers active on Swedish soil. After the summer recess my assumption is trilateral relations will see a new blossoming, a new positive phase including Swedish authorities taking a much closer look at both PKK/YPG and FETÖ fugitives hiding in Sweden, much less so in neighbouring Finland as there are only isolated terror pockets. This in turn will allow for a complete restructuring of bi-lateral relations (trade, tourism, education, smart cities, energy and so on and so forth).

Commenting on your latter part of the question, and very briefly, NATO would be best advised to start a serious soul-searching effort, acknowledging that Ankara is not only a leading member country but as a matter of fact could show the way forward to a much more politically inclusive structure. Why not nominate a future NATO Secretary General from Türkiye to underline this point to the entire world?

Question 2:

Stockholm was the oldest neutral country in the world. However, it decided to abandon its long-standing policy of neutrality by taking sides with Ukraine and now joining NATO. What is the strategic calculus behind Sweden's quest to join NATO?

With all fairness, proposing to join NATO was one of the most difficult internal decisions the Swedish Social Democrats ever had to make. It must be analysed within the framework of two entirely opposing paradigms.

First, the Social Democrats are by its history a peace promoting party and that includes struggles against oppression all around the world. The one country, terror clan they always got completely wrong was and is the PKK and its YPG satellite confusing them with and for freedom fighters instead of being baby killers. We mentioned that point earlier on.

Neither joining the EC nor NATO was ever on their cards.

Then times changed, the Council of Europe lost most of its credibility, the EU started on planning for a Single Market, and in 1995 Sweden joined. Money was a serious pull factor most definitely, so was obtaining leading administrative positions in Brussels and of course sending deputies to the European Parliament. Gaining international standing by joining the EU? Ask Germany, certainly!

Second, joining NATO was a totally different political ballgame. It turned social democrat neutrality values upside down. But again, since another 'freedom fighter' cause was on the horizon - Ukraine - what alternative?

Strategic quest - become a globally much more visible actor, perhaps compete with Türkiye for position of Secretary General.

Last not least, Sweden's political spectrum has changed dramatically. The centre-right plays the Sweden First game, so in order to win again at the ballot box the Social Democrats must do the same. A strong Sweden in a strong NATO against the 'foreign aggressor' - a winning formula perhaps?

Question 3:

As Sweden and Finland ratify their NATO accession, bringing the alliance's membership to 32 countries this autumn, and with Türkiye having received guarantees on terrorism, what did NATO achieve politically and militarily, given Russia's opposition to Sweden's NATO membership?

Well, your third question can unfortunately be answered rather quickly... NATO will enlarge, me not expecting any huge roadblocks come October neither from Hungary nor Türkiye. Sweden will eventually start to accept legitimate FETÖ, other extradition requests from Ankara as they know very well if not NATO accession is shelved. But the 'unfortunate' is linked to something else - NATO did not stop the war in Ukraine with Russia, individual member states do and did. NATO is a deterrent and protective shield, not an aggressor itself.

NATO needs Article 5 to react. Ukraine will not join NATO anytime soon. Is NATO obsolete? Sure not. Is there a joined European Army in the making? Of course not. Will Moscow attack a NATO member country? Never. In a nutshell: is Moscow worried about NATO expanding? Just that little... will Vladimir Putin change tactics due to NATO expansion? My guess, not really. If individual states continue to supply Ukraine with heavy weaponry and impose further sanctions on Russia, all might change though. Most important - the bloodshed in Ukraine must end one way or the other, and fast.