



DISCUSSION PAPER

The Ideational Pillars of China's Rise

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
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Introduction

With the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union following 45 years of the Cold War, the United States declared victory on a global scale. This marked the "end of history," as articulated by Francis Fukuyama referring to the triumph of liberalism. Consequently, the bipolar international order transformed into one with a unipolar character dominated by the U.S. For the defenders of liberalism who firmly adhered to the belief that this temporary equilibrium would be permanent, it was almost an unpredictable scenario that China, which had an economy that was 1:6 the size of the United States at the time, would turn into such an economic colossus. During this period, globalization under the leadership of the U.S. became institutionalized in many fields, particularly as it concerns the economy, and paved

the way for the integration of different actors into the free trade system. Honoured with the "most-favoured-nation" status throughout the 90s and admitted to the World Trade Organization in 2001, China has become an indispensable part of global supply chains, international free trade, and new investment branches. Combining its historical and cultural elements with economic development, China has gradually become the most significant challenger of the Western-led international order. This paper explores how China seeks to ideologically build regional and international hegemony through a set of historical and cultural elements as a way of framing its global identity. Confucianism, Harmonious Society, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence can be seen as three important ideational pillars China seeks to advance as an alternative to those historically stipulated by the Western-led international order.



(Miguel Candela - Anadolu Agency)

The Era of 'Good Feelings': Liberal Engagement and its Reversal

In the post-Cold War era, the largest economic ramification of the liberal institutionalist trend in the globalizing world was the broadening of trade liberalization through the World Trade Organization. Since the era of Deng Xiaoping (1978-1989), who has been called the "architect of modern China", China has made extensive reforms to liberalize the hitherto planned economy programme. The country had also been in talks to join the WTO since 1986. Providing the conditions for full membership (customs duties, compliance agreements, and trade transparency principles), China remained a "most-favoured-nation" economic partner of the United States throughout the 90s. Likewise, the WTO has kept China in this status as a candidate with equal rights with other member countries.

With access to new markets, China accelerated its export-led economic growth. According to the World Bank (2022), before becoming a full member of the WTO, the ratio of exports to GDP was around 18-20% in 2000, while this ratio reached 36% in 2006. Foreign Direct Investment, which was \$42.1 billion in 2000, reached 253.1 billion dollars in 2020. The share of trade in GDP terms showed an increasing trend throughout the 90s and reached 64% in 2006. China's GDP, which was \$1.21 trillion in 2000, rose to \$17.73 trillion in 2021, reaching the capacity to compete with the United States. In 2009, China became the largest exporting economy in the world. Looking at these and many other indicators, it is clear that China has achieved huge economic growth, especially after its membership in the WTO. The underlying idea that paved the way for such a major shift in the Chinese economy was undoubtedly what Mearsheimer (2021) called "liberal engagement". The U.S. did not choose to act in line with containment, instead, it opted to engage China during the 1990s. So, what should we understand by the "liberal" side of the main theme defined as this "liberal engagement"? This question is of particular importance because consecutive US administrations from President Clinton to Trump followed the same approach towards China. The main expectation during this era of good feelings was that China would make liberal reforms that expand civil rights and liberties, as well as become a more democratic country as a consequence of its integration into the global trading system. In other words, it was thought that economic liberalization and political liberalization would go hand in hand. In the aftermath of the Cold War, and until the Trump era, American foreign policy classified China as a most favoured nation.

The main expectation held by four presidents from George H.W. Bush to Obama was that economic liberalization could be a significant push factor to achieving political liberalization. Full Chinese membership in the WTO was a priority of the U.S during the 1990s. "Today the House of Representatives has taken a historic step toward continued prosperity in America, reform in China, and peace in the world. . . it will open new doors of trade for America and new hope for change in China." [said](#), President Bill Clinton when the U.S. House of Representatives had just approved China's membership in the WTO.

Pursuing liberalism in international politics created a popular perception that realpolitik was thrown into the ash heap of history. However, under the Trump and Biden administrations, the policy of liberal engagement has been pushed to the wayside and replaced by realism, though belatedly. At the end of the day, an economic colossus emerged, but contrary to expectations, almost no progress was made in terms of individual rights and freedoms, which are the cornerstones of political liberalism. According to the V-Dem Project, China's 2020 score was measured as 0.2 in the Civil Liberties index which took a value between 0-1. After joining the WTO, China tightened control over privately held corporations and regulated internet access. Another point worth mentioning is the assimilation policy of China toward the Uighurs. Detention under the name of social integration in the "re-education" camps implemented based on Han Chinese national identity has engendered harsh criticisms. During the Trump administration, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo strongly criticized China by declaring [that](#) its policies on Muslims and ethnic minorities in the western Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region constitute "crimes against humanity" and "genocide".

As new fronts are opened in the global power competition, the approaches of American foreign policy towards China are shifting from liberal engagement to realism. Yet, some still underline that China will not surpass the United States because there is still a long way to go in non-economic spheres. The use of soft power and public diplomacy are some of the areas in which the gap between the U.S. and China is too large to surpass. According to Nye (2017), complex interdependency under globalization has brought new actors into international politics. For instance, instead of a strict realist view that sees the nation-state as the only actor in international power politics, Nye draws



U.S. President Barack Obama in Beijing. (Tevfik Durul - Anadolu Agency)

attention to non-state actors such as transnational corporations, civil society associations, universities, and so on. Accordingly, it is seen as a mistake to equate globalization fully with trade agreements. Trade and economics, in other words, are only one aspect of globalization. Globalization is a complicated phenomenon through which new power networks, technological innovations, and the use of soft power also constitute effective leverage for the U.S. against its peer competitors. China still lags behind the U.S. in these areas. Nye argues that China's expected benefits outweigh the costs of an exit from the liberal international order in economic terms. It is an actor that depends on the benefits provided by the WTO. Nevertheless, this analysis is flawed for two main reasons. First, those who favour a liberal engagement policy ultimately failed because China did not make any genuine political liberalization at home. It has just strategically instrumentalized the lucrative opportunities given by the liberalization of global economic networks and focused mainly on its own economic development. Moreover, increasing Chinese imports brought some negative externalities to the U.S. such as unemployment¹. Second, one can never estimate how an actor in the international system will develop its growth trajectory. Al-

though China is now 4th in the soft power [rankings](#) in which the U.S. is the 1st by a landslide, China will continue to increase its prospects for cultural and hegemonic power in the Asia Pacific. The international balance of power structure is shifting from unipolarity to multipolarity with which the importance of regional primacy is significantly rising. The Belt and Road Initiative is not only a comprehensive project of infrastructure and energy investments but also a golden opportunity for China to strengthen its international image and reputation (Yağcı, 2018). Additionally, China's ongoing investments in African countries have a stimulating impact on its international perception as a "benevolent" economic colossus that does not ignore underdeveloped nations. The essence of the issue, therefore, is to examine the signals given by China and try to contextualize them by considering the changes and transformations in the international system.

On the whole, the expectations held by the defenders of liberal engagement policy did not manifest. The Chinese economy has grown without necessarily liberalizing individual rights and freedoms domestically. So, what sort of ideologies has China leveraged as alternatives to liberal values?

¹ A study by Acemoğlu et al. (2015) suggests that between 1999 and 2011, almost 6 million U.S. manufacturing jobs were lost because of competition with Chinese cheap labour and imports.

Ideational Pillars of a Rising China

We can examine the concept of interest as a combination of ideational factors and material elements. While the latter is often attributed to material benefits such as profit, cheap access to energy resources, or even expanding one's territory that one country expects to gain from an economic transaction or political negotiation, the former has to do more with the way through which a country frames itself in the eyes of the international community. Therefore, ideas are sometimes the best ways to understand how a country wants to be perceived by other actors in the international arena. In addition, ideas are generally reflected in domestic politics. Policy choices, discourses and actions by political figures are shaped around a certain set of ideas, making them coherent and structured. Ideas may not always have an actual reflection, either. As a matter of fact, the issue of ideational factors mentioned here is mostly an image and persuasion effort about how a country wants to be recognized. Thus, even if a country has adopted a fairly coherent set of ideas and even adopted it as an official ideology, the reality may conflict with the requirements of *realpolitik* – as this is often the case. Before delving into the ideational aspects of an economically rising China, it may be helpful to give an example that demonstrates how ideational elements and reality may be in contradiction. After 45 years of the Cold War, the United States shifted the shape of its foreign policy according to liberal principles. Accordingly, the ultimate way to make a country and ultimately the whole world liveable was to design a foreign policy behaviour embellished with liberalism's individual, political and economic principles (Mearsheimer, 2018). Starting with the Middle East, U.S. foreign policy showed keen interest in transforming illiberal regimes into liberal democracies. Once one of the regimes here changed, this change would be reflected in other illiberal regimes through a domino effect. Take Iraq, for example. From the American perspective at that time, it was an oil-rich country ruled by the brutal dictatorship of Saddam Hussain. So, the only way to change this course was to invade and topple the autocratic regime². This took place under a comprehensive project that became known as the 'Global War on Terror'. This form of foreign policy, originally aimed at increasing the global reach of liberalism, led to the creation of an illiberal atmosphere in the domestic political setting in the U.S. For instance, enacting the infamous Patriot Act paved the legal way for tapping individuals' phone calls and monitoring their internet access and e-mails. Moreover,

this illiberal turn was not limited to the American domestic context. The Guantanamo Bay detention camp is a good example of how human rights were severely violated. Reports by Amnesty International [reveal](#) that after 9/11 many people were held without justification and were subjected to various methods of torture and oppression. The "liberal" dream, therefore, had turned into an illiberal dystopia. We will now turn to two major ideational pillars of a rising China and try to examine to what extent they have actual reflections on the foreign policy behaviours of the country.

1. Confucianism

For over 2000 years, Confucianism has constituted one of China's major moral thought systems. During this long period, there were periods when the doctrine was popular and subsequently fell out of favour. Confucianism, which consists mainly of teachings that we can consider a social and moral philosophy rather than a religion, is a tradition of thought [that](#) has accepted values and norms in society and attaches importance to social institutions such as family and school. It also prioritizes human relationships based on mutual respect and responsibility and puts that a perfect society is achievable only if each member of society conforms to his or her role. Therefore, there seems to be a close association between conformity and a perfect society ideal. One of the points related to our subject is how the concept of war is explained in Confucian teaching. According to one [interpretation](#), in Confucian ethics, war is defined in terms of its function. Ran Qiu, one of the students of Confucius explains its function as the elimination of evil and the bringing of good.

The Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which took place under the leadership of Mao Zedong in the period after 1949, consisted of policies that were completely opposite to the elements of traditional Chinese culture. It was during this period that Confucian rhetoric lost its popularity on the grounds that it was associated with feudalism and tradition. However, nothing remains static, and cultural perceptions have also changed over time. The period of liberalization and opening that started under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, one of the architects of modern China, transformed into a completely different situation with the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests and massacre. After the social disturbance suppressed by the strong repression of

² The Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 - Declares that it should be the policy of the United States to seek to remove the Saddam Hussein regime from power in Iraq and replace it with a democratic government. To see the original document, <https://www.congress.gov/bills/105th-congress/house-bill/4655>



(XINHUA - Anadolu Agency)

the Chinese Communist Party, Chinese people fell into a moral vacuum as the Communist ideology, in which they had been indoctrinated for many years, gradually weakened. Adler [defines](#) this new period as "Confucius fever" in which many books were written about Confucian ethics and people had a renewed interest in reading and re-interpreting Confucius's analects. Currently, one can talk about admiration and pride regarding Confucian moral thought in Chinese public opinion. This renewed interest has also been embraced by the political administration. The central administration of the Chinese Communist Party, which wants to emphasize the richness of Chinese culture and that the Chinese civilization is the first civilization in the world, has developed a particular discourse practice shaped around patriotism and nationalism by adapting the set of values that includes Confucianism as one of the benchmarks of Chinese tradition. Even those who were sympathetic to Confucian thought were seen as enemies during the Cultural Revolution in which the official ideology was based on strict communist tenets. However, it is today a moral philosophy embraced by the political elite. The instrumental use of Confucianism has two dimensions. First, the CCP uses its emphasis on ethics as a way of establishing harmony in society and developing a particular notion of Chinese nationalism. It was clearly understood that the strict dictates of Communism as a state ideology did not find a convenient place in Chinese public opinion as it was once expected by Maoist state tradition. There-

fore, the political elite transformed itself into a much more responsive and sensitive position vis-à-vis Chinese people in order to strengthen political legitimacy. Second, Confucianism has become a useful tool for implementing soft power in the international arena (Lo and Pan, 2013). Opening Confucius Institutes in different countries since 2004 has become one of the soft power priorities of the Chinese administration. [According](#) to official data, there were 548 Confucius Institutes around the world by the end of 2018, as well as 1,193 Confucius classrooms based in primary and secondary schools. In one of his public statements, FBI Director Christopher A. Wray warned [that](#) Confucius Institutes are among the entities used by the Chinese government as "non-traditional collectors, especially in the academic setting".

2. Harmonious Society

The concept of a 'Harmonious Society' was introduced by Chinese President Hu Jintao in 2004. When we examine the particular contexts in which the concept is utilized, we see [that](#) the concept has a particular function of addressing the negative impacts of globalization such as increasing inequalities and environmental costs of economic growth. The concept stipulates the very necessity of a stable political environment, sustainable prosperity, and people living in peace. Moreover, the concept emphasizes [that](#) China should have an active and assertive foreign policy

and try to deepen its cooperation with other countries in order to reach this ideal “harmonious” society both domestically and internationally. Despite some persistent ambiguities and very broad frames of meaning in official documents, the concept of a harmonious society can be seen as a major ideational pillar of an economically rising China in terms of creating a benevolent hegemonic power perception in the eyes of the international community. The word “harmonious” has a close association with Confucian ethical thought which is another major moral-philosophical pillar of China. ‘Harmonious Society’ is one of the maxims in Confucian ethics that seeks to improve a harmonious interpersonal relationship in a community (Wong, 2011).

One can see different reflections of the concept of a harmonious society in China's foreign policy initiatives. For instance, through infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China puts itself in a position that reflects the idea that it is possible to prosper together by building harmonious connections between different countries from Central Asia to Europe. 147 countries involved in the BRI are seen as different parts of a whole, but they are bound together under the umbrella of this initiative (Asif and Ling, 2018). Similarly, when we look at China's investments in Africa, it is possible to see the reflections of the notion of a harmonious society. China's African investments have mainly focused on infrastructure and solar energy systems. Its growing involvement in the continent is in line with the concept of a harmonious society. China ascribes its role as a power that seeks to be helpful to underdeveloped parts of the world and this particular theme of helping or assisting is one of the components of the harmonious society vision. This theme also has reflections in foreign policy discourses. For instance, at the COP26 talks held in Glasgow last year, China [criticized](#) developed countries for failing to provide funding to combat climate change committed to both developing

and underdeveloped countries.³ Similarly, Lin Boqiang, director of the China Centre for Energy Economics Research at Xiamen University, spoke about China's clean energy investments in African countries, pointed out the expensiveness of Western funds and technologies, and [stated](#) that Chinese-based investments are more suitable for such underdeveloped countries. These remarks are important in the sense that they demonstrate how China constructs its international identity consisting of benevolence and altruistic motivations. The “harmonious society” ideal is not restricted to the domestic sphere but expands on the international community in a way that shapes the perception of other nations in favour of a “helpful” China, which is embedded in Confucian ethics and harmonious society vision.

3. Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence

Together with Confucianism and the concept of a *harmonious society*, China's foreign policy behaviour is also shaped by a set of principles that are generally known as the Five Principles of Coexistence or *Panchsheel*. The five principles were firstly mentioned in the Sino-Indian Agreement in 1954. China set economic and security cooperation targets with the countries in the Asia-Pacific by referencing these principles in the bilateral agreements it has made with Afghanistan, Burma, Nepal, India, Cambodia, and Pakistan. These principles can also be seen in China's Constitution as a preamble (Jiali and Thakur, 2004).

1. Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty
2. Mutual non-aggression
3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs
4. Equality and cooperation for mutual benefit
5. Peaceful coexistence



BRICS summit in Xiamen. (Xinhua News Agency/ Pool - Anadolu Agency)

³ At COP 17, parties decided to designate the Green Climate Fund (GCF) as an operating entity of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, in accordance with Article 11 of the Convention. At COP 21, it was also decided that developed countries shall jointly provide USD 100 billion annually by 2020 for mitigation and adaptation. For more details, see <https://unfccc.int/topics/climate-finance/the-big-picture/climate-finance-in-the-negotiations>

The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are often [seen](#) as China's official way of justifying its criticisms of interventionist policy decisions made by Western countries in the UN Security Council. One of the most recent developments was, for instance, experienced at the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian War. China [abstained](#) from blaming Russia for the invasion in the UN General Assembly vote. A similar development was seen in the past during Russia's annexation of Crimea and the subsequent status referendum. China again [abstained](#) from the UN vote condemning Russia and declaring the annexation illegitimate. By emphasizing its strict commitment to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and especially referencing mutual non-interference, Chinese foreign policy has become a reflection of its critical stance against the Western-centric international order. Instead of the universality of norms,

therefore, China chose to act in a particularistic and contextual way by arguing that each nation in the international system has a different historical, cultural, and geopolitical significance that cannot be generalized. Standardized norms of international politics, for China, only produce net benefits for those who built them.

Former Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao's use of the phrase "to live together in harmony" in his [speech](#) during the fiftieth anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, quoting Confucius, is in fact a continuation of the previously mentioned themes of *Confucianism* and *Harmonious Society*. China has adapted these two visions as the main contours in the modus operandi of its foreign policy.

Principles versus Practice

Given the fact that China often emphasizes its strict commitment to *Confucianism*, *Harmonious Society* and *Panchsheel*, it seeks to instrumentalize the Western-led international order, thereby prioritizing its national interests. For instance, while a harmonious society vision seems a coherent ideational pillar that complies with a human-centric set of values, China has mostly failed to follow this pattern in practice. Civil liberties have generally been sacrificed for the sake of consolidation of central power in the hands of the Communist Party of China. According to the V-Dem Project, China's score in the *internet censorship effort index* has gradually decreased from the 1990s to today, implying a strict government intervention regarding internet access for the Chinese people. Similarly, the academic freedom index has shown a decreasing pattern over the last decade and has approximated zero.⁴ The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence have also become another way of framing national interests and bypassing certain international norms and regulations. As stated above, China acts in accordance with mutual non-interference and mutual respect or sovereignty when there is a conflict between two countries. These major principles seem to outweigh other international principles stipulated within the framework of Western-led international order. One of the areas where we observe how China uses the five principles is the use of force against a country that commits crimes covered under Responsibility to Protect (R2P). To recall, all nations agreed upon the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as a result of the failure to respond to the genocides in Rwan-



70th session of the United Nations General Assembly
(UN Photo/Loey Felipe / Pool - Anadolu Agency)

da and Srebrenica, and R2P became an international norm [that](#) seeks to ensure that the international community never again fails to halt the mass atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. When we look at China's harsh stance towards such an interventionist norm before 2005, it is seen that China was making its [objections](#) to R2P in the context of mutual respect for sovereignty and non-interference, which are two of the five principles of coexistence. Since the R2P is

⁴ For an interactive graph, visit V-Dem Project's website https://v-dem.net/data_analysis/CountryGraph/

also one part of the liberal international order, China did not want to empower this order by agreeing to all requirements stipulated by the R2P. China's position was rather in favour of a particularistic understanding of concepts such as human rights and it has historically rejected to comply with an international order imposed by Western countries (Thakur, 2006). However, over time, China has changed its previously strict attitude toward R2P and become more tolerant in terms of adaptation. The way for R2P to gain international norm qualification has been paved, but as can be seen in the UN voting records, China's scepticism of the use of force continues.⁵ While having a full commitment

to the international norms and principles on paper, China does not show the same commitment in practice. Instead, it implements its own way of foreign policy choices in line with its five principles. As a rising power, China has a double-edged strategy. On the one hand, it adheres to global norms and principles in order to increase its international presence and prestige. On the other hand, it emphasizes its individuality or sovereignty in the international community by acting according to its own set of values at the points where international principles do not equate with its own interests.

Concluding Remarks

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the international balance of power shifted to a form in which the US was the sole pole. The liberal character of American foreign policy at that time drew the ideational lines of international politics as a liberal set of values. As a result of political and economic globalization efforts during this era, China, which was not a great economic power at that time, achieved massive economic development. Today, China, one of the giant economies of the world with a GDP of \$17 trillion, is on the way to becoming the most powerful nation in the Asia-Pacific, just like the US in the Western hemisphere. However, for becoming a regional hegemon, it is necessary to embrace a certain set of values in addition to economic power and military might. Accordingly, the ideational pillars of a rising China have been formed around three main components: Confucianism, Harmonious Society, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. These themes constituted the discursive fault lines of domestic and foreign policy. However coherent they may seem, principles do not always hold true when it comes to realpolitik. While China's signals to the international community are clearly articulated, one can see several problems in practice. Confucianism and Harmonious Society, for instance, are not genuinely reflected within domestic politics due to the very necessity of consolidation of power. Civil rights and liberties are often sacrificed for political stability under the rule

of the Communist Party of China. Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence is not different, either. When it comes to international power politics, China uses these principles as a cover and takes revisionist foreign policy decisions in line with its national interests. With its strict commitment to mutual non-interference and respect for sovereignty, China generally abstains from any UN General Assembly or Security Council vote, thereby ascribing itself as an impartial nation to other nations' internal affairs. Since international power politics has a dynamic character, time will show how China will be positioned in the global distribution of power. In any case, it will rest upon a particular set of ideational factors in order to frame its national interests and have an internationally prestigious position.

⁵ Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as an international norm consists of three pillars:

Pillar One: Every state has the Responsibility to Protect its populations from four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.

Pillar Two: The wider international community has the responsibility to encourage and assist individual states in meeting that responsibility.

Pillar Three: If a state is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take appropriate collective action, in a timely and decisive manner and in accordance with the UN Charter.

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