



DISCUSSION PAPER

The Srebrenica Genocide and the Denial Narrative

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Introduction

The Srebrenica Genocide (also referred to as the Srebrenica Massacre), in which Serbian soldiers massacred more than eight thousand Bosniak civilians during the Bosnian war (1992-1995), has been affirmed as the worst incident of mass murder in Europe since World War II. Furthermore, despite the UN's "safe area" declaration prior to the genocide in the region, the Bosnian Serb Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) under the command of Ratko Mladić executed more than 8,000 Bosniak (Bosnian Muslims) men and boys and deported approximately 25,000 women, girls, children, and elderly people. During these deportations, many reported instances of rape, murder of women and children, and deliberate starvation. Moreover, these "planned exterminations" (Lara 2013: 242), which continued for nine days and covered an area of approximately 300 square kilometres, took place under the watch of the United Nations Protection Force's 370 lightly armed Dutch soldiers, known as 'Dutchbat', that the UN sent to protect the region and its people (United Nations, 2004).

Despite the ongoing debate regarding the number of murders¹, this mass ethnic cleansing was declared a genocide by the UN on April 19, 2004, in the court case number: IT-98-33-A, International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 under *PROSECUTOR v. RADISLAV KRSTIĆ*.

In this case, the factual circumstances, as found by the Trial Chamber, permit the inference that the killing of the Bosnian Muslim men was done with genocidal intent. As already explained, the scale of the killing ... is a sufficient factual basis for the finding of specific intent. The Trial Chamber found ... that the killing was engineered and supervised by some members of the Main Staff of the VRS.⁵⁷ The fact that the Trial Chamber did not

attribute genocidal intent to a particular official within the Main Staff may have been motivated by a desire not to assign individual culpability to persons not on trial here. This, however, does not undermine the conclusion that Bosnian Serb forces carried out genocide against the Bosnian Muslims. (United Nations, 2004:12)

Further prosecutions were pursued against the Dutch state in the Dutch Supreme Court for not preventing the deaths of Bosniak men, women and children that took refuge in their zone located in Potocari. The first case was in 2013² when the Dutch state was held responsible for the death/murder of three Bosniak men. In 2014 they were again held liable for the death of 300 Bosniak men and boys at Srebrenica in July 1995.³ In 2019 however, a final verdict ruled that the Dutch state was only 10% liable for the 350 deaths in the region without declaring how this percentage was calculated.

The UN itself took partial accountability for the massacre, as reflected in the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's 1999 statement that "the tragedy of Srebrenica will haunt our history forever."⁴

The UN also published a 155-page report in 1999 admitting to their misconduct in preventing the genocide:

Through error, misjudgement and an inability to recognise the scope of the evil confronting us, we failed to do our part to help save the people of Srebrenica from the [Bosnian] Serb campaign of mass murder.⁵

The most recent trial regarding the genocide was against former Bosnian Serb commander Ratko Mladic, who lost his appeal against a 2017 conviction for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity in which the UN court upheld the life sentence for his part in the massacre of more than 8,000 Bosniak men and boys.⁶

¹ While some studies suggest that the death rates are around 7000, there are many that express the death toll as over 8000.

² Amnesty International, International Secretariat. (2013, September 27). KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS: Netherlands Supreme Court hands down historic judgment over Srebrenica genocide [Press release]. Retrieved from https://www.amnesty.org/en/news/2013/09/27_4204.html

³ Dutch state Liable over 300 SREBRENICA DEATHS. (2014, July 16). BBC. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28313285>

⁴ United Nations, Secretary-General. (1999, October 11). UN BOSNIA EXPERIENCE ONE OF MOST 'DIFFICULT AND PAINFUL' IN ITS HISTORY SAYS SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MEMORIAL CEREMONY IN SARAJEVO [Press release]. Retrieved from <https://www.un.org/press/en/1999/19991011.sgsm7168.doc.html>

⁵ Lynch, C. (1999, November 15). Report: U.N. 'Appeased' and Unwittingly Aided Genocide. Washington Post. Retrieved from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/pmextra/nov99/15/unitednations.htm>

⁶ Srebrenica massacre: UN court rejects Mladic genocide appeal. (2021, June 08). BBC. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-57346523>



Bosnian families follow the final verdict in the hearing of the former Bosnian Serb general Ratko Mladic also known as the "Butcher of Bosnia" in the ethnic cleansing case by the International Criminal Tribunal, at the Srebrenica Genocide Memorial in Potocari in Srebrenica, Bosnia And Herzegovina on June 08, 2021. The 78-year-old former general was sentenced by the UN court to life imprisonment in 2017 for genocide in Srebrenica and crimes against humanity. A UN court in The Hague on Tuesday upheld a 2017 life sentence for former Serb commander Ratko Mladic for his role in the genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Elman Omic - Anadolu Agency)

Media Coverage

Although the war and genocide in Srebrenica were reported in the Turkish media extensively, the same could not be stated for the European media. This lack of media coverage in Europe may have been due to the media's disinterest, different priorities, insufficient information, misinformation, or propaganda tactics. Understanding the media coverage of the Bosnian war and genocide may clarify, to some extent, the reasons why there are conflicting notions and denial narratives about the massacre.

As an example of insufficient information, Dutch journalist Bart Rijs, who worked in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992, and from 1994 to 1998, blamed himself for the insufficient and inaccurate depiction of the incidents. He based this on his dependency on media reports from other cities and was excessively willing to believe

external reports about the role of the Dutchbat in Srebrenica. According to Rijs, the brutal massacre of 8,373 Bosnian men and boys by the Army of Republika Srpska and the Scorpions paramilitary unit⁷ in the UN-designated 'safe area' of Srebrenica was as much a surprise to journalists as it was to Dutch politicians and peacekeepers.

According to Dutch media reports, the main concern was the safety and wellbeing of the Dutchbats, which shows indeed there were different priorities of the media. The Dutchbats were depicted as victims that were trying to survive during the conflict. Only in September 1995, months after the genocide, did the Dutch press cover the massacre of more than 8,000 Bosniak citizens.⁸

⁷ The Scorpions were a Serbian paramilitary unit active during the Yugoslav Wars that were involved in war crimes during the wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo.

⁸ Idzinga, A., Halilović, A., & Bakija, M. (2021, January 23). Dutch media and the Srebrenica genocide: Coverage Or Cover-up? Retrieved from https://balkandiskurs.com/en/2018/07/11/dutch-media-srebrenica/#_ftn1

Due to the press' cooperative relationship with the Dutch Ministry of Defence between 1992 and 1995⁹, they tended to focus on the failures of the United Nations and the Dutch Government instead of investigating the sequence of wartime events. As a result, incomplete reporting eventually resulted in overlooked facts. However, it is hard to conclude to what extent such omissions can be attributed to the journalists and the media since their task to provide accurate information was made difficult by the Dutch Ministry of Defence and Serb restrictions on in-country journalists.

The prevalence of incomplete reporting and misinformation may also have been due to the propaganda tactics of the media in the region before, during and after the war. Propaganda had already begun in Yugoslavia before the outbreak of the war in 1992 through the injection of ideas of ethnic superiority, fear of ethnic violence etc., into the public discourse. For example, during the War, Bosniaks received support from a group of foreign fighters known as the 'Bosnian Mujahedeen'. While there were extremists elements among them, they were primarily comprised of young Muslim men from Afghanistan, Egypt, Turkey, Iran, Morocco and even the UK and US, who set out to fight alongside Bosniak forces. Although estimates of their exact number vary,¹⁰ there is a widespread understanding that the Serb media exaggerated their numbers and painted them all as extremists and terrorists to instil fear and anti-Muslim hatred.

While several independent media outlets focused on the issues in Sarajevo, the majority supported the parties of the conflict, which considered media control as an indispensable method of political power. For example, Slobodan Milosevic (Serbia) and Franjo Tudjman (Croatia) seized control of most of the media outlets (radio, television, newspaper) in order to report atrocities with the aim of spreading hatred on both sides during the war. This assisted in sustaining the 3-year Bosnian conflict and continues to obstruct the formation of a steady peace in the region (Thompson, 2002).

Furthermore, there were numerous incidents in which the rapes and killings that took place in Bosnia were caricatured in certain Western media outlets, which

not only serves to undermine the seriousness of the issue but also flares racial slurs, ethnic and religious hate against the victims. For example, Charlie Hebdo's caricatures, which depicted crude images of the rape and genocide victims, sparked outrage among Bosnians and Muslim Societies worldwide. Two caricatures published on various dates during and the War (January 13, 1993; November 30, 1994) mocked the rape issues in B&H, and one caricature posted after the genocide (July 10, 1996) showed an image of a man resting on the bones belonging to the genocide victims. What is more, these images were further supported among other media outlets claiming that they were covering the war in their own "creative" way.¹¹

According to some sources mentioned above, both the Serbian and Bosnian sides used propaganda during the war to either justify their actions or present themselves as victims. For example, according to one source:

All sides involved in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia deployed propaganda. Alongside real violence, wildly exaggerated reports of various abuses and atrocities also circulated. Both the Serbian and the Muslim side claimed that during the Bosnian war their babies had been thrown as food to zoo animals. Propagandists misrepresented enemy dead as members of their own ethnic group or, with respect to civilian massacres, claimed that the other side had killed its own people for propaganda purposes (as with the Sarajevo breadline massacre of 1992 or the Racak massacre of 1999). All parties used documentary and feature film propaganda, the best-known controversy surrounding the award-winning film *Underground* (1995), directed by Emir Kusturica (1954-), which was viewed by some as serving a Serb agenda. (Cull, Culbert, & Welch, 2003: 36)

Both sides also used their access to domestic and foreign media outlets to spread misinformation/exaggerated information. For this reason, the outside world faced difficulty following the events and discovering the facts about the crimes. Thus, many of the "facts" published by both Serbian and Bosnian media outlets continue to be refuted until today (Cull, Culbert, & Welch, 2003: 45).

⁹ Before 1995, the Dutch media's main focus was the well-being of the Dutchbats in the region instead of the casualties of war and the suffering of the citizens.

¹⁰ In 2003, Charles R. Shrader reported that retired general of the Croatian Defence Council, Tihomir Blaškić estimated the numbers to be 3,000 to 4,000, but according to testimonies given in the ICTY trial against Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez the actual figure would probably be closer to 2,000. In 2017, a Center for Strategic and International Studies report stated that "figures range from 500-5,000 with a preponderance of estimates in the 1,000-2,000 range".

¹¹ Rucevic, M. (2015, January 09). "In its own creative way, Charlie Hebdo was covering the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina too". Retrieved from <https://www.sarajevotimes.com/creative-way-charlie-hebdo-covering-war-bosnia-herzegovina/>

The Denial: How it all Started

Denialism, also known as 'historical negationism', is the act of falsifying and distorting historical facts to fit a specific narrative. Unlike historical revisionism, it does not set out to find a new approach or perspective based on new evidence but presents a biased approach to the evidence.

Following the physical destruction of people and their material culture, memory is all that is left and is targeted as the last victim. Complete annihilation of a people requires the banishment of recollection and suffocation of remembrance. Falsification, deception and half-truths reduce what was to what might have been or perhaps what was not at all (Hovannisian, 1998:202).

Despite overwhelming forensic evidence of these crimes and unanimous rulings by several international courts regarding the Srebrenica Genocide, including the discovery of mass graves whose occupants had been reburied as part of a cover-up, the denial of the genocide continues on an international scale. However, considering that propaganda had started prior to the war, it is natural for false information to be a justification for the denial of the genocide based on the misinformation that was spread before the war; for example, justifying the war as "civil" instead of an instance of "ethnic cleansing" before the genocide. Moreover, this justification is not limited to those who carried out these war crimes. Although in 2010 the Serbian parliament adopted a resolution condemning the killings and presenting the victims' families with an apology, at no stage was the word "genocide" used. Instead, the events were referred to as "war crimes".¹² This may be important in terms of accepting the responsibilities; however, it initially supports the claims of Genocide denial. Additionally, in 2012, the President of Serbia Tomislav Nikolic claimed: "There was no genocide in Srebrenica"¹³.

Sonja Biserko, President of Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, an NGO focusing on the human rights issue in Serbia, wrote that the "Denial of the Srebrenica genocide takes many forms [in Serbia]. The methods range from the brutal to the deceitful. Denial is present

most strongly in political discourse, the media, the sphere of law, and the educational system" (Biserko, 2012).

One of the most infamous examples of historical negationism is the *Report about Case Srebrenica*, written by Darko Trifunovic and was first published in 1995 by the Republika Srpska Government Bureau for Relations with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The report claimed to "present the whole truth about crimes committed in Srebrenica region regardless of the nationality of perpetrators of crimes and time when they were committed". The report claimed that Aliye Izetbegovic, who served as the first President of the newly independent Republic of B&H, wanted to create an "Islamic State within the borders of B&H" with his 'radical Muslim allies' (Trifunović, 2002). The report also claims that only 2,000 Bosniak soldiers (not civilians) had died during the war, and most of them had died during combat. The chapter dedicated to the "Alleged Massacre" emphasised that only 100 people had died due to exhaustion and state "the number of Muslim soldiers who were executed by Bosnian Serb forces for personal revenge or simple ignorance of international law [...] would probably stand less than 100." (Prosecutor v. Deronjic, 2004: 69) The report also attempted to damage the statement of people who testified about the genocide by maiming them as mentally disturbed as a result of the trauma they suffered during the war. As a result of these traumas, the report claims that the way they talked about the events was just their imagination. Throughout the report, we see a crude attempt at rationalisation¹⁴ and/or trivialisation (the claim that the number of victims is exaggerated, that the presumed victims were mainly provocateurs and enemy collaborators, or that even though many people have died, there was no intent to destroy a group (Altanian, 2017)).

Local methods of denial were evident during the reign of the former President of Republika Srpska and the current member of the presidency of B&H, Milorad Dodik. The current Prime minister, Ana Branbic, is also a prominent politician who denies the genocide

¹² Serbian declaration on Srebrenica Massacre an imperfect but important step. (2011, June 22). Retrieved from <https://www.ictj.org/news/serbian-declaration-srebrenica-massacre-imperfect-important-step>

¹³ Srebrenica 'not genocide' - Serbia's PRESIDENT NIKOLIC. (2012, June 01). BBC. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18301196>

¹⁴ According to Karlsson rationalisation is when there is no/not enough valid evidence to conclude an event of genocide (Altanian, 2017)



Srebrenica Genocide denier Peter Handke receives his 2019 Nobel Literature Prize from King Carl Gustaf of Sweden during the Nobel Prize award ceremony organised in Stockholm. (Jonas Ekstromer / POOL / EPA - Anadolu Agency)

and is taking action to spread this denialism. There have been many articles that support these claims throughout the media regarding the support of denialism by interfering in the education system. One of the methods is preventing children from receiving knowledge about the genocide in schools¹⁵ and Dodik has worked vigorously to remove the references to the genocide from school textbooks.¹⁶

Additionally, according to UN Tribunal Head Judge Carmel Agius, children are indoctrinated with genocide denial by the Bosnian-Serb government.¹⁷ In another interview, Agius confirms the reality of the denial, which he condemns, by stating that those responsible for war crimes should be openly revealed and prosecuted.

The use of social media trends to spread political ideologies on a global scale may seem trivial. However, considering the power and mass audience is an important tactic used for political gains. One

of the most recent examples of reaching a global audience for political gains is an internet meme inspired by the Bosnian Genocide adopted by far-right extremists online –the “remove kebab” meme, which not only encourages panic, hate but also prevents a compromise. The meme is a derivation from a Serb wartime militaristic song called “Karadzic, lead your Serbs”. The word “kebab” is a satirical ethnoreligious slur used to refer to Muslims in general. Since the meme was initiated in Serbia, it is used to refer to Turks and Bosniaks.

While the education system has been designed to prevent access to learning about the genocide discreetly, a more direct method towards denialism has been put forth by honouring those responsible for the genocide and openly denying it. Examples include naming buildings after those who carried out the genocide and defining them as “war heroes.”¹⁸

¹⁵ Erasing the srebrenica genocide [Video file]. (n.d.). Retrieved from <https://www.trtworld.com/video/social-videos/erasing-the-srebrenica-genocide/5d25e292b9fa6764a9a57fb3>

¹⁶ Sito-Sucic, D. (2017, June 06). Serb President bans teaching ABOUT SARAJEVO SIEGE, Srebrenica genocide. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bosnia-serbs-history-idUSKBN18XISL>

¹⁷ Berg, S. (2020, July 08). Bosnian Serb government indoctrinating children Over Srebrenica, U.N. TRIBUNAL head says. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bosnia-srebrenica-warcrimes-idUSKBN2491TY>

¹⁸ Dodik named a student dormitory after wartime leader Radovan Karadzic. He also built several monuments in dedication to war leaders.

However, the denial claims were not limited to a report and have swiftly spread among the public on an international scale. Those responsible for peddling revisionist narratives of the genocide in Srebrenica include political actors at all levels of state and sub-state governments, as well as academics, journalists, and various institutions. For example, in 2015, Russia, China, Angola, and Venezuela voted in the UN Security Council to reject a resolution that would formally recognise the events of July 1995 in Srebrenica as genocide, claiming that the use of the word 'genocide' would exacerbate tensions and that the resolution was "not constructive, confrontational and politically motivated"¹⁹. Nevertheless, awarding genocide denier Peter Handke with The Swedish Academy's Nobel Literature Award was an act that can confirm the deliberate show of genocide denialism on an international level. This act was significant for several reasons. Not only did this signify a denial that went beyond the borders of the B&H, but it also, in a way, formally justified the global act of denial as well. Handke's denial of the Bosnian Genocide and support for Slobodan Milosevic was pervasive. He visited Milošević during his detention in The Hague and is remembered for making a famous speech at Milosevic's funeral in Požarevac, Serbia, in 2006, in which he exclaimed: "The world, the so-called 'world' knows everything about Yugoslavia and Serbia. The world, the so-called 'world', knows everything about Slobodan Milosevic, so-called 'world' knows the truth this is why so-called 'world' is absent today. And not just today and not just here. I do not know the truth but I watch, I listen, I feel, I remember. This is why I am here today at Yugoslavia's side, at Serbia's side, at Slobodan Milosevic's side."²⁰ This award symbolises/reflects the current atmosphere of anti-Muslim bias in Europe. Although there has been an enormous backlash regarding the award, including Christina Doctare's return of her award in which she stated, "I was proud of the Swedish Academy, but all I feel now is shame and guilt", the fact that this idea of denial is widespread among prominent figures in public is inevitable.

There are also many claims of "alleged genocide" among prominent academics, including western revisionist Noam Chomsky. Chomsky revises the word genocide by claiming that it should be carefully placed to prevent it from being undermined. In the book



Former Nobel Award winner Christina Doctare holds her Nobel Medal, which she received in 1988 for working with the UN peacekeeping force in Bosnia, stating that she will return the award to protest Peter Handke's Nobel Literature award. (Atila Altuntaş - Anadolu Agency)

The Politics of Genocide, written by fellow revisionists Edward Herman and David Peterson, the authors examine the use and "abuse" of the word genocide. The chapter regarding the B&H genocide uses words like "genocide claim," such as:

The Bosnian Muslim leadership had started touting claims of 200,000 deaths by early 1993, only some nine months after the start of these civil wars, and figures such as this and 250,000 (and sometimes higher) quickly became institutionalised in the establishment media, helping to push the "genocide" claim and to justify calls for foreign intervention to protect the Bosnian Muslims. But this claim came to grief in 2005–2007, when two different studies, the first sponsored by the ICTY itself and the other by the Norwegian government, concluded that the Bosnian conflicts had resulted in combined deaths on the order of one hundred thousand for all sides, including both civilians and military victims. Given their sources, these findings could not easily be ridiculed as "holocaust denial" or "revisionism," but they were treated in very low-key in the Western media, only slowly displacing the much higher 200,000–250,000 figures—and with no analyses and explanations of the earlier gullible acceptance of the implausible and unverified Bosnian Muslim propaganda claims. (Herman & Peterson, 2010: 47)

¹⁹ Nichols, M. (2015, July 08). Russia blocks U.N. condemnation of Srebrenica as a genocide. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bosnia-srebrenica-un-idUSKCN0PI1W620150708>

²⁰ Šeko, Y. A. (2020, May 19). Bosnian genocide Denier Peter Handke Receives Nobel Prize in literature. Politics Today. Retrieved from <https://politicstoday.org/bosnian-genocide-denier-peter-handke-receives-nobel-prize-in-literature/>

Conclusion

On March 29, 2021, European Commission spokesperson Ana Pisonero, stated that the EU rejects all denials of the 1995 Srebrenica Genocide and exclaimed that a “Denial of well-documented and established facts about wartime events, including war crimes, or revisionism contradict the most fundamental of those values.”²¹ Pisonero also implied that in order for B&H’s accession process to the EU to be accepted, they must first comply and promote the EU values of democracy, human rights, tolerance and justice. However, according to the EU’s latest Commission Opinion published by the European Commission in 2019 on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application for membership of the European Union, B&H has yet to fulfil these criteria.²²

The political environment is not yet conducive to reconciliation and to overcoming the legacies of the past. Established facts about the wartime events are frequently contested by high-level political leaders, who cast doubts on the independence and impartiality of international tribunals. All actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina need to demonstrate full 7 Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual, intersex people 10 cooperation with the international tribunals by acknowledging and respecting their decisions. Revisionism and genocide denial contradict the most fundamental European values. (Networks & Commission, 2020: 9-10)

Genocide denial, in general, can be considered alongside anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and radical right-wing terrorism, all of which can directly threaten minority communities and increase violence towards them. The denial of the genocide of referred groups encourages intimidators and underlines their downgrade. This puts them at greater risk of future discrimination, violence, which is formed by the spread of radical right-wing ideology across Europe. Just as Holocaust denial fuels right-wing violence against Jewish communities, historical revision (denialism) of the genocide against Bosniaks encourages Islamophobia among the far-right.

Historical revisionism regarding the Srebrenica Genocide also aims to spotlight the Bosniaks; in other words, the picture is re-drawn to make Muslims the problem. For example, in an interview with *The Economist*, French president Emmanuel Macron stated, “if you’re concerned about this region, the first question is neither Macedonia, nor Albania, it’s Bosnia-Herzegovina. The time-bomb that’s ticking right next to Croatia, and which faces the problem of returning jihadists, is Bosnia-Herzegovina.”²³ Thus, instead of condemning white supremacists and politicians who deny the genocide, he decided to focus on the marginalised community. The genocide against Bosnian Muslims has even been a source of inspiration in recent violent right-wing terror attacks, such as the attack perpetrated by Brenton Tarrant, a white supremacist who murdered 51 Muslim worshippers on March 15, 2019, in Christchurch, New Zealand. During the attack, which he live-streamed online, engravings of the names of Serbian nationalists inscribed on the rifle he used to carry out the attacks were visible. In the same live-stream video of the attack he uploaded to Facebook, he listened to a far-right Chetnik song praising Radovan Karadžić, the Bosnian Serb leader convicted of war crimes, immediately before the first shooting²⁴.

The effect of the internet in the spread, legitimisation, strength of violent ideologies is undeniable. Therefore, it is more important now than ever to at least reduce the negative impact of genocide denial, which is fueling radical right-wing terrorism across the globe, as it can never be eliminated entirely. As recent denials have become more widespread, particularly with social media, counterarguments can also use the power of the internet to raise awareness of genocide denial.

Denial has been a part of almost every genocide in history despite the clear evidence. Therefore, even though it may not be possible to completely eliminate the notions of denial, emphasising the facts and covering the events without demining or exaggerating the truth is crucial while engaging in the denial debate.

²¹ Szucs, A. (2021, March 29). EU pushes against denial of Srebrenica genocide. *Anadolu Agency*. Retrieved from <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/eu-pushes-against-denial-of-srebrenica-genocide/2192062>

²² Networks, D., & Commission, E. (2020, February 19). COMMUNICATION from the commission to the European parliament, the Council, the European economic and social committee and the Committee of the regions a European strategy for data, COM/2020/66 final. Retrieved from <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/ac9cd214-53c6-11ea-aec0-01aa75ed71a1/language-en>

²³ Dutch state Liable over 300 SREBRENICA DEATHS. (2014, July 16). *The Economist*. Retrieved July 06, 2021, from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28313285>

²⁴ Serbian soldiers used to play this song in their trucks while heading to conflict zones and massacre areas during the Bosnian War.

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