

Assessing the Biden Administration's Worldview:

Continuity and Change in the US Foreign Policy

Muhammed Lutfi Türkcan



(Tayfun Coşkun - Anadolu Agency)

This policy outlook contrasts aspects of change and continuity between the Biden administration's foreign policy priorities and its predecessor. The Biden administration aspires to regain international supremacy by restoring its global leadership. However, the new White House team may face challenges in mobilising its traditional allies and partners around its leadership. This challenge stems from an increasing perception internationally that US power is waning. Recent events, including the failure to address the Covid-19 pandemic and the January 6 incident at the US Capitol have reinforced such an impression. Additionally, China's growing influence via its enormous economic power appears to be another obstacle facing US global leadership. Finally, the Biden Administration has to cope with the fact that the liberal international agenda has become unpopular domestically and overseas.

Biden's Foreign Policy Vision

Four years of Donald Trump's presidency have marked a remarkable break with traditional US foreign policy. In his analysis of this period, President-elect Joe Biden has [criticised](#) President Trump for undermining the US-led liberal order, abandoning US allies and partners, launching ill-advised trade wars against foes and allies and damaging the American middle class. Biden has also contended that during the Trump presidency, Washington stepped away from its global leadership role, ceded multilateral cooperation and turned away from supporting democratic values around the world. In this context, Biden has revealed his plans to [return](#) to what is regarded as 'normal' US foreign policy. For [some](#) Biden's picking of seasoned and experienced diplomats for the position of foreign policy and national security who are mostly familiar faces from the Obama administration is an indication of the return to normalcy and resetting of US foreign policy. Biden has picked Antony Blinken, who served as national security adviser to Biden under Obama administration, as Secretary of State. John Kerry, who served as Secretary of State during the second term of Obama administration, has been chosen as Special Envoy on Climate Change. Biden has picked Jake Sullivan who served in senior positions in the State Department during the Obama era as National Security Advisor. For some, the new Biden Administration [looks](#) a lot like a third-Obama term, an accusation that has been [refused](#) by Biden himself on the grounds that his administration faces its own unique set of challenges and circumstances.

Biden has revealed that his administration will first set out to [restore](#) democracy at home with the notion that democracy is the building block of the US strength, security and prosperity. The incoming administration also plans to [form](#) a unified front consisting of democracies in order to renew the liberal world order. In this vein, Biden has pledged to convene a global Summit for Democracy in the first year of his presidency to form a common agenda and to strengthen democratic values across the world. He has also announced that the US will [re-join](#) the Paris Climate agreement on the first day of the new administration and seek to [revive](#) the Iran nuclear deal. The Biden administration has also pledged to design US foreign policy in a way that will serve to the interests of the American [middle class](#) by taking immediate steps with regards to infrastructure, education and research development at home. Concerning immigration, the Biden administration has promised to [reverse](#) Trump's policies in the months to come. Hence, it appears that the incoming Biden administration will make an effort to re-establish the US credibility, utilise diplomacy as the first instrument and address global problems through multilateralism and promote democracy at home and abroad.



Joe Biden and Kamala Harris give a speech after their electoral victory (Andrew Harnik/Pool/EPA - Anadolu Agency)

There are certain areas, however, that will likely see continuity with the Trump administration. Following the same line as President Obama and President Trump, Biden has also [pledged](#) that the US will reduce its military presence across the world while pursuing its security interests through special force operations. Like Trump, Biden has signalled his opposition to so-called 'forever wars' and has indicated his intention to bring the US troops home from Afghanistan and the Middle East and focus more on global terrorism. Yet, the incoming administration might find itself in a tough position with regards to a full withdrawal of US troops and intelligence officers from Afghanistan in accordance with Trump's [deal](#) with Taliban signed in February 2020. According to the [deal](#), the Trump administration would completely withdraw US forces from the country by May 1, 2021, while Taliban was supposed to cease attacks, end its ties with terrorist groups and engage in dialogue with the Afghan government. In line with the deal, the Trump administration has reduced the number of troops from 8,600 to [4,500](#) and then to [2,500](#) on 15 January. Although the Biden administration shares Trump's objective of ultimately pulling out all US troops from Afghanistan, the accelerated timeline as well as lack of reciprocal actions by the Taliban and increasing [terror attacks](#) in the country have raised concerns for the Biden team as complete withdrawal might put Afghanistan and peace negotiations in jeopardy. Hence, the Biden administration might consider [slowing](#) down the withdrawal process in order to re-evaluate the progress of the peace talk and the Taliban's activities on the ground. Additionally, as Trump did, Biden has also highlighted that NATO allies should do their fair share and increase their defence spending. However, it is expected that Biden's tone with allies will be more diplomatic and less direct. With regards to the rise of China, like Trump, the Biden team has also [acknowledged](#) that Beijing's growing influence poses significant challenges to the US interests and requires a substantive response. Yet, the new administration plans to mobilise other countries for a collective response instead of Trump's unilateral policies vis-à-vis China.

Biden's China Policy

There has been an emerging [consensus](#) in the US foreign policy community that a tougher line is necessary to counter China. This trend emerged during the Obama presidency with the [launch](#) of the "Pivot to Asia" strategy designed to counter China's growing influence. President Trump stepped up the pressure on China both on the rhetorical and policy level. After characterising China as a [revisionist power](#) seeking to undermine the US interests, the Trump administration determined the Indo-Pacific as the "[priority theatre](#)" and focused on the "[re-emergence of long term strategic competition](#)" with China. In accordance with this policy orientation, the Trump administration has waged a trade war against Beijing, resisted China's claims and militarisation efforts in the South China Sea, [developed](#) closer relations with Taiwan, and put [restrictions](#) on Chinese tech firms including Huawei and TikTok. More recently, the Trump administration blamed China for the pandemic, ramped up military exercises in the region and imposed diplomatic sanctions.

In his past roles, Biden actively worked for the achievement of the US policy of engaging with China. According to this approach, by [encouraging](#) China's integration into the world, the US would reap political and economic benefits while helping to transform Beijing into an open and democratic country. In this sense, Biden [stated](#) in 2011 that "I remain convinced that a successful China can make our country more prosperous, not less." However, under the leadership Xi Jinping, Beijing has adopted more assertive and ambitious foreign policy, started a military modernisa-

tion process and shifted the balance of power in Indo-Pacific in its favour. Given the increasing influence of China and its potential to emerge as a regional hegemon in Asia, the incoming Biden administration is expected to pursue a China strategy reflecting the main tenets of the previous administration as it has been [acknowledged](#) by the Biden team that China poses broad economic and political challenges to the US interests. It should be also noted that the Biden administration [will](#) likely make more of an effort to cooperate with China on certain issues including climate change, future pandemics and disruptive technologies. In this manner, while acknowledging that China is a "formidable competitor", Jake Sullivan, Biden's pick for National Security Advisor [made](#) a case for "managed coexistence" with China in 2019 by arguing that "coexistence means accepting competition as a condition to be managed rather than a problem to be solved".

It is worth to note that during the presidential campaign in May 2019, Biden downplayed the China challenge by [saying](#) "China is going to eat our lunch? Come on, man . . . They're not competition for us". However, this statement caused backlash as both Republicans and Democrats [criticised](#) him. Later, Biden adopted a firmer approach towards China as he [said](#) in February 2020 about President Xi Jinping "this is a guy who doesn't have a democratic . . . bone in his body. This is a guy who is a thug, who has a million Uighurs in . . . concentration camps." Additionally, in his Foreign Affairs article where he outlined his team's foreign policy vision, Biden [stated](#) that "China presents a special challenge" adding that "the United States does need to get tough with China." Hence, it can be expected that



Chinese President Xi Jinping greets then Vice President Joe Biden during an official State Arrival Ceremony at the White House in Washington, on September 25, 2015. (Samuel Corum - Anadolu Agency)

US-China relations will be marked by confrontation and escalation. For instance, with regards to the tariffs imposed during the Trump presidency, Biden [announced](#) that they will not be lifted immediately. On the other hand, it is also expected that the Biden administration will have a more consistent and measured style in dealing with the China challenge than their predecessors.

Regardless of the shared understanding that the US needs to more effectively counter China, the Biden administration will undoubtedly differ from the Trump administration, who embraced a unilateral and [go it alone](#) approach, in how this is actually carried out. Mobilising the US' traditional alliances in Europe and Asia will be the main mechanism of this strategy. Biden has previously [contended](#) that "the most effective way to meet that [China] challenge is to build a united front of U.S. allies and partners to confront China's abusive behaviours and human rights violations". The rationale he presented for this strategy is based on the assumption that, since the combined economic capacity of democracies constitutes half of the global economy, China cannot rule out severe economic consequences should it decide to stand against what Biden hopes will be a unified front of democracies. In this respect, as mentioned, Biden has [promised](#) to convene a global Summit for Democracy in order to revive the unity of the democratic countries. How to deal with China will be top on the agenda. However, it should be also noted that hosting such a summit might not be a [good idea](#) in itself and it might [fail](#) in producing expected outcomes as it risks creating or deepening a division between so-called democratic countries and the rest thereby reducing the possibility of global cooperation on pressing issues. Additionally, based on which criteria or definition of democracy the Biden administration will invite countries to the summit might also prove challenging as even the US suffers from democratic backsliding. Moreover, the plan to mobilise partners might face reluctance as both Asian and European countries [appear](#) unwilling to alienate China.

Additionally, the Biden administration has also drawn attention to the importance of advancing democratic values around the world, which increases the expectation that the language of human rights and of compliance with international rules and norms will be used more frequently against China by the new administration. It should thus come as no surprise that Biden's pick for Secretary of State Blinken recently [tweeted](#) that "The Biden-Harris administration will stand with the people of Hong Kong and against Beijing's crackdown on democracy." As such, the new administration is expected to be attentive to the situation of [Uighurs](#) in Xinjiang province on the Hong Kong issue. It should be also noted that the Trump administration has recently ramped up its [criticisms](#) towards China's human right violations by particularly referring to the situation in Xinjiang province.

The Future of Trans-Atlantic Relations

Transatlantic relations have gone through a disruptive period during the Trump presidency. With the "[America First](#)" policy, the Trump administration adopted a negative attitude towards international organisations and institutions, which have traditionally been supported on both sides of the Atlantic. The Trump administration has also withdrawn from the key multilateral institutions and agreements including the [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action](#) (JCPOA), [Paris Climate Agreement](#), [UN Human Rights Council](#) and the [World Health Organisation](#), which has drawn criticism from European allies. Furthermore, Trump [called](#) the European Union a foe of the US, harshly [criticised](#) European leaders, [threatened](#) them with economic sanctions, [questioned](#) the value of NATO and [declared](#) it all but obsolete.



NATO Leaders' Summit in London on December 4, 2019. (TUR Presidency Murat Çetinmühürdar - Anadolu Agency)

In contrast, Biden has sent clear messages that the strained relations with America's European allies will be [restored](#) quickly and the US will re-assume its democratic leadership role. Biden has also revealed that the US will [renew](#) its commitment to multilateralism and support democratic values abroad. Regarding the future and relevance of NATO, which became a topic of concern for the members of the alliance thanks to the Trump's scepticism, Biden [reassured](#) the "US" enduring commitment to NATO – including its bedrock principle of collective defence under Article 5" via a phone call with the head of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg. Biden has also [highlighted](#) the importance of keeping NATO's military capabilities strong against Russia. Hence, the incoming administration is set to rebuild the US reputation and credibility in the eyes of the European allies and mobilise them in order to strengthen multilateralism and rules-based liberal order. Among others, rejoining the [Paris Climate agreement](#) and the [JCPOA](#) will be priorities.

Despite the Biden administration's stated intention to restore relations, there remain certain factors that might harden the process. Firstly, with increasing concerns regarding the US commitment to the security of Europe during the Trump administration, an old debate revolving around the strategic autonomy of Europe has [resurfaced](#). Indeed, the EU has recently taken significant steps in this direction by launching new [initiatives](#) such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and European Defence Fund (EDF) in order to enhance joint defence investment and develop collaborative defence capabilities. Despite the [contention](#) of some politicians and analysts that a self-sufficient Europe contributes to the strength of transatlantic relations, pushing for independence in foreign and security policy might lead to frictions in the US-Europe alliance on critical security issues and might undermine common threat perceptions.

The China challenge is a case in point. The Biden administration has contended that multilateral [pressure](#) is needed against China and referred to Europe as a natural partner in the competition with China. Although Europeans have recently [acknowledged](#) China as a "systemic rival", they still hold a nuanced understanding of the China threat, and are not on exactly the same page as Washington on this point. While the Europeans view China as an economic and political challenge and the European perception of China has been largely degraded during the pandemic, they also [consider](#) cooperation with Beijing as possible and beneficial. Hence, if the Biden administration prefers adopting an assertive stance against China, the Europeans might become reluctant to choose between Washington and Beijing because of the leverage China holds with its vast economic reach. In this regard, Jake Sullivan, Biden's pick for National Security Advisor [stated](#) that "China always saw an escape hatch through their economic relationships with others[...] Only by closing off those escape hatches would you get China to curb their trade abuses." However, as a demonstration of the challenges that lay

ahead, China and the EU [struck](#) an investment treaty in December following seven years of negotiations. During the Trump presidency, Washington tried to convince the Europeans to change their trade and technology policies through coercion, threats and sanctions while Biden is expected to do the same through dialogue, diplomacy and incentives. However, its success will be dependent upon the relative capabilities and resources of the US vis a vis those of China.

Given the possibility of Russian [aggression](#) in the region, maintenance of US security guarantees and military deployments becomes more important for Europeans. The fact that the Indo-Pacific might become the central focus of tUS foreign policy might require Washington to spend extra efforts to reassure the Europeans who favour the maintenance of the US leadership in the continent that the US security umbrella will remain. If the US decides to reallocate its resources and forces towards Asia, this might risk increasing a fear of abandonment on the European side which might, in turn, impact Washington's policy priorities.

Biden's Middle East Policy

For the incoming administration, the Middle East will be another important region. The Biden foreign policy team will face a quite different region compared to the Obama period thanks to the latest developments and Trump's policies. The incoming Biden administration has [revealed](#) that they will pursue a less conciliatory approach towards Israel with regards to Palestine, put more pressures on Saudi Arabia and try to re-join the nuclear deal with Iran. As [stated](#) by Biden, Washington will seek to advance human rights and democracy around the world including the in the Middle East. Yet, these efforts may turn out to be primarily rhetorical, including verbal condemnations of those who commit abuses, without actually putting in the necessary resources to alter behaviours. Biden's choices for the foreign policy [team](#) consisting mostly of the veterans of the Obama administration indicates that there might be a return to the previous administration's Middle East policy. While this entails that critical issues will be handled by experienced US diplomats, it also means that the incoming administration will carry the baggage of the previous administration's decisions, particularly with regards to the perceived failure to have adequately supported the Arab Spring, and those taken with regards to the war in Syria and Yemen and the fight against Daesh.

The Israeli-Palestinian peace process appears set to continue dominating Washington's Middle East agenda. Over the last four years, the Trump administration has given a "blank cheque" to Israel and adopted a feverish pro-Israeli stance vis a vis the Palestinian question and other Israeli regional policies. As such, Trump [moved](#) the US embassy to Jerusalem, cut off relations with the Palestinian Authori-

ty and refused to support the two-state solution. Additionally, the Trump administration [recognised](#) Israeli sovereignty over the occupied Golan Heights and championed normalisation [agreements](#) between the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco and Israel. The election of Biden has increased worries on the Israeli side as to whether the incoming administration will adopt an attitude similar to that of the Obama administration during which US-Israeli relations experienced a [deteriorating](#) trend. There have been also [concerns](#) as to whether the gains achieved during the Trump period will be reversed by the Biden team. Yet, the new administration has indicated that these moves will not be reversed. In this respect, Biden's nominee for Secretary of State [stated](#) that Biden will "never walk away from Israel's security, even at times when he might disagree with some of its policies." Nevertheless, the Biden administration is expected to adopt a more balanced approach to the Israel-Palestinian issue by resuming funding to the Palestinian Authority and recommitting to the two-state solution. Kamala Harris stated in November [that](#) the new administration will take "immediate steps to restore economic and humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people, address the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Gaza, reopen the U.S. consulate in East Jerusalem, and work to reopen the PLO mission in Washington." This suggests that the traditional US policy of verbally advancing the two-state solution will continue.



U.S. President Donald Trump, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Bahrain Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani attend a signing ceremony for the agreements on "normalization of relations" at the White House in Washington, United States on September 15, 2020. (The White House / Tia Dufour - Anadolu Agency)

Regarding Saudi Arabia, the Biden administration has indicated that there will be a break with the Trump administration's policies. Trump has been criticised for neglecting human rights violations in the Kingdom, giving a pass to the Saudi leadership over the [killing](#) of Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 and [struck](#) massive arms sale deals, which are being used in Saudi Arabia's military operations in Yemen. In his criticism of Trump policies, Blinken [said](#) that Trump had "basically given a blank cheque [to Saudi Arabia] to pursue a disastrous set of policies, including the war in Yemen, but also the murder of Jamal Khashoggi". Hence,

departing from Trump's policies, the Biden administration is expected to put more pressure on Saudi Arabia over human rights violations and halt arms sales. Additionally, it is worth noting that Blinken, together with other officials from the Obama administration, had [called](#) on Trump to end his administration's support to Saudi Arabia's military operations in Yemen in an open letter in 2018. The Biden administration can also be expected to pursue a similar policy towards the United Arab Emirates when it comes to UAE's regional activism. However, for a number of different reasons, it appears as though the Biden administration's stance towards the UAE will be more [tolerant](#) and less confrontational than it may be towards Saudi Arabia.

Regarding Iran, the Trump administration adopted a confrontational approach, [withdrawing](#) from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018. The deal was negotiated and signed during the Obama presidency with terms limiting Iran's nuclear activity and lifting of US sanctions. The Trump administration, then, implemented what it called a "[maximum pressure](#)" campaign through which the US imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions on Iranian officials and firms, targeting the country's oil and financial sectors. As a result, the Iranian economy was hit hard. This is in addition to the Trump administration's [killing](#) of top Iranian commander, General Qasem Soleimani, with drone strike in Iraq in January 2020. Consequently, US-Iran relations have been marked by increased confrontation during this period. The incoming Biden administration has [criticised](#) the Trump administration's decision to withdraw from the nuclear deal as provocative. It has been [revealed](#) that the incoming administration plans to revive the nuclear deal on the condition that Tehran comply with the original agreement. On that note, Sullivan, who played an active role during the negotiations with Tehran for the nuclear deal, [stated](#) that the deal can be preserved and enhanced through diplomacy, indicating that a new deal that includes other issues related to Iran's regional policies may be negotiated. In reaction to the Biden administration's intention, Iran's Foreign Minister Javad Zarif [said](#) that Tehran will comply with the deal as soon as Washington lifts all sanctions. He also noted that the new administration should give reassurances of its commitment to the deal while adding that they will not renegotiate the deal. Although both sides have revealed their intention to revive the deal, it appears that they both want the other side to take the first step. Even if both sides return to 2015 deal, US-Iran relations will continue to be tense for a variety of reasons including Iran's missile programme and other regional activities.

With regards to Syria, both the Obama and Trump administrations followed a more or less similar strategy of disengagement and failed to address the civil war and humanitarian crises while the Daesh threat became the primary focus of concern. The Biden administration has not revealed a distinct Syria strategy so far and it is expected that the [status quo](#) will be maintained. As such, sanctions im-

posed on the Assad regime are expected to remain while preventing a resurgence of Daesh with a limited number of US forces on the ground will be one of the priorities in Syria. In line with his overall foreign policy vision, Biden might also be [expected](#) to revive the UN-led Geneva Peace Talks with the support of European allies. However, this will require the US to collaborate with other regional actors particularly Russia, Iran and Turkey as they have become key players in Syria. In particular, the Biden administration's attitude towards the PKK's Syrian offshoot, the YPG, will be of critical importance for NATO-member Turkey. However, [the appointment](#) of Brett McGurk, who served as the Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter Daesh (otherwise known as ISIS) from 2015 to 2018, as Middle East coordinator on Biden's National Security Council is concerning for Turkey since he is [considered](#) as a staunch Turkey critic and of being in favour of US partnership with the YPG. It should be also noted that the Biden administration might be more attentive to the eruption of another humanitarian crisis in Syria compared to Trump administration as both Blinken and Sullivan have [acknowledged](#) that the US "failed to prevent a horrific loss of life" and "massive displacement of people".

Can the US Lead?

One of the main tenets of the Biden administration's foreign policy is to return the US to a position of global leadership. Last November, Biden [said](#) that "America is back ... ready to lead the world, not retreat from it" adding that world leaders were "looking forward to the United States reasserting its historic role as a global leader over the Pacific, as well as the Atlantic, all across the world". Reflecting the same aspiration, the Foreign Affairs [article](#) written by President-elect Biden to delineate the foreign policy priorities of the Biden team was titled 'Why America Must Lead Again'. In this article, Biden contended that, thanks to the certain unique features of the US - its democratic values and institutions, its enormous capacity and the fact that the American nation is built upon the idea of leadership, the US has the responsibility to mobilise other democracies in order to respond to the world's most pressing challenges. Additionally, Biden [contended](#) that the incoming administration will renew the US commitment to advancing human rights and democracy around the world. Indeed, the idea of American exceptionalism and the perception that the world needs US leadership coupled with



US President Donald Trump's supporters gather outside the Capitol building in Washington DC., on January 06, 2021. Pro-Trump rioters stormed the US Capitol as lawmakers were set to sign off on Joe Biden's electoral victory in what was supposed to be a routine process. (Tayfun Coşkun - Anadolu Agency)

the commitment to the spread of democracy and human rights have long been embedded in the US [foreign policy community](#). Hence, the previous administrations of Barack Obama, George W. Bush and Bill Clinton embraced similar ideas, which can be called [liberal internationalism](#). In reflecting the liberal internationalist tendency in the Biden administration, Biden's nominee for National Security Advisor, [wrote](#) in an Atlantic article in 2019 that American exceptionalism constitutes the basis for American leadership, adding that "despite its flaws, America possesses distinctive attributes that can be put to work to advance both the national interest and the larger common interest." For Sullivan, these distinctive attributes of America's exceptional role include positive-sum thinking, problem-solving spirit, comfort with power and appreciation of the common good.

Yet, given the changing circumstances both domestically and internationally, to what extent the Biden administration can achieve its liberal dreams remains an open question. Firstly, given the US' declining credibility during the Trump period and increasing perception that US power is waning relative to other rising powers, most notably China, the new administration will find it difficult to restore the US' 'unipolar era' during which it championed the liberal world order. Additionally, even if the US intends to lead the world with the support of its democratic allies and existing institutions, it should be noted that China has gone to great lengths in incorporating international [institutions](#) created by the US and enhanced its bilateral relations with other democratic and non-democratic countries. Hence, Beijing has shown itself to be a key global actor willing and able to lead during a period when Trump administration retreated from the world stage. This suggests that the US will not find a vacuum in global politics, which was the case in the aftermath of the Cold War, to renew its self-assumed role of global leadership.

Secondly, Trump's "America First" policy was in stark contrast to Biden's "America is Back" approach. During the Presidential campaign, Trump lambasted previous administrations for pursuing foreign policies that put Americans at a disadvantage, wasted money on foreign operations and democracy promotions and subsidised the security of wealthy democracies. According to a Pew poll [conducted](#) in 2016, 57 per cent of US citizens agree that the US should "deal with its own problems and let others deal with theirs the best they can". This reveals that American people were not supportive of internationalism at that time. Even if the Biden administration won the election, the [trends](#) that brought Trump to power remain. Hence, the incoming administration might face a domestic backlash in its pursuit of global leadership.

Finally, for its critics, liberal internationalist foreign policy can hardly be considered a success, even on its own terms. For instance, John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, [contends](#) that the US aspiration

since the end of the Cold War to establish a liberal hegemony in the world was bound to fail because the liberal internationalist spirit is resisted by nationalist feelings at the local level. In a vein, Harvard University professor Stephen Walt [argues](#) that the liberal internationalist policy has not only drained US strength and prosperity but also brought about disastrous consequences such as the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and Russia's intervention in Georgia and Ukraine in 2008 and 2014, respectively. Additionally, the world has witnessed a declining trend in global freedom over the last 14 years despite democracy promotion efforts.

Hence, the Biden administration's aspiration to re-establish liberal hegemony through democracy promotion efforts abroad could backfire, resulting in adverse consequences and provoking resistance to the US self-assumed leadership role by inciting nationalist feelings. Finally, in light of the severe drop in US soft power during the Trump presidency, which was further dented by the storming of Capital Hill by Trump supporters, there is [little appetite](#) internationally for another sequel to the liberal hegemonic order.