Strategic Argument and Areas of Debate
The normalisation between Türkiye and the Gulf states represents a profound strategic realignment driven less by ideological reconciliation and more by a shared imperative to manage the power vacuum left by the shifting security posture of the United States. This pragmatic rapprochement highlights the irony that former regional adversaries are now forced into complex, multipolar cooperation to mitigate the very geopolitical instability they previously exacerbated through proxy competitions in the Middle East.
Executive Summary
The discussion paper examines the strategic recalibration of relations between Türkiye and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations, specifically Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, as they transition from ideological rivalry to pragmatic normalisation following the 2021 Al-Ula agreement. Driven by the partial retreat of the United States from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and the need to counter regional threats, these states are prioritising multidimensional geopolitical cooperation over previous conflicts rooted in the Arab Spring. The normalisation process is further shaped by the growing influence of Russia and China, compelling regional powers to adopt a humanitarian and enterprising foreign policy and seek new security alignments to ensure long-term stabilisation in contested arenas like Libya and Syria.
Analytical Framework and Key Drivers
- Humanitarian and Enterprising Foreign Policy: Türkiye adopted this doctrinal approach to balance realpolitik with ideal-politik, acting as a regional mediator and expanding its soft power during the turbulent post-2010 Arab Spring environment.
- Multipolarisation of Gulf Security: The gradual withdrawal of the United States under the Trump administration and Biden administration forced Gulf Cooperation Council states to diversify their security alliances, inviting Türkiye, Russia, and China into the regional architecture.
- Qatar-Türkiye Supreme Strategic Committee: Established in 2014, this alliance served as a critical counterbalance against the Saudi-led coalition during the 2017 Gulf Crisis, cementing Türkiye as a formidable military and geopolitical actor in the Gulf.
- Post-Arab Spring Pragmatic Rapprochement: The 2021 Al-Ula agreement marked a structural shift away from ideological zero-sum conflicts over political Islam, enabling the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia to prioritise economic and security stabilisation with Türkiye.
Strategic Assessment & Empirical Findings
- The 2021 Al-Ula agreement successfully ended the blockade against Qatar and catalysed the normalisation of diplomatic and economic relations between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
- Türkiye‘s bilateral alignment with Qatar peaked in 2014 with the establishment of a joint defence cooperation agreement, leading to the deployment of Turkish military forces and a strategic base in Doha that rivalled US and French presence.
- The assassination of Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 severely deteriorated relations between Ankara and Riyadh, culminating in an unofficial Saudi boycott that was only resolved when Türkiye transferred the legal case to Saudi Arabia in 2022.
- While early 2000s cooperation was driven by a flourishing Turkish economy that grew by nine per cent by 2010, the modern rapprochement is overwhelmingly dictated by geopolitical and security imperatives rather than purely bilateral trade volume.
- The geopolitical stalemate in proxy conflict zones, notably the military competition in Libya during 2019-2020, ultimately forced Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates to seek convergence, exemplified by their mutual endorsement of interim Prime Minister Fathi Bashagha.
- The expanding footprint of China as the largest foreign direct investment investor and top trading partner for the Gulf Cooperation Council presents a systemic challenge to Türkiye‘s ambition to become the primary regional security guarantor.
Geopolitical Trajectories & Policy Risks
- Türkiye‘s ongoing military operations against the PKK and YPG in northern Iraq and Syria threaten to undermine the fragile normalisation with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, particularly if Gulf engagement with the Assad regime conflicts with Turkish security objectives.
- The Gulf Cooperation Council states’ strategic dependency on Russian and Chinese defence and energy architectures risks marginalising Türkiye‘s role as a regional security guarantor, complicating Ankara’s efforts to establish a dominant military-industrial presence in the Gulf.
- The overarching vulnerability to Iranian regional proxies continues to force a delicate balancing act, wherein any failure by Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Israel to coordinate their containment strategies could result in a destabilising resurgence of proxy warfare in Syria and Iraq.
Critical Policy Questions & Responses
Question 1 How does the shifting security posture of the United States accelerate the normalisation of relations between Türkiye and the Gulf Cooperation Council?
Answer: The partial military and diplomatic retreat of the United States during the Trump and Biden administrations created a profound security vacuum in the Middle East, eroding the absolute defence guarantees historically relied upon by the Gulf Cooperation Council. This structural vulnerability compelled Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to abandon their ideological rivalries from the 2017 Gulf Crisis and proactively engage with Türkiye to establish a self-reliant, multipolar regional security architecture.
Question 2 What strategic trade-offs does Türkiye face in attempting to balance its alliance with Qatar against its renewed diplomatic engagement with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates?
Answer: Türkiye must carefully navigate its deeply institutionalised military and political partnership with Qatar, which was solidified through the 2014 Qatar-Türkiye Supreme Strategic Committee, without triggering the historical threat perceptions of the broader Arab Quartet. To sustain normalisation, Ankara is forced to compartmentalise its ideological support for political Islam and focus purely on pragmatic defence and economic cooperation, avoiding the zero-sum proxy conflicts that previously derailed relations in Libya and Egypt.
Question 3 Why do geopolitical security imperatives outweigh bilateral economic investments in driving the recent rapprochement between Ankara and Riyadh?
Answer: Although Türkiye experienced a nine per cent economic growth rate by 2010 that initially attracted Gulf capital, recent trade data reveals that Gulf Cooperation Council investments constitute only a marginal fraction of Türkiye‘s overall international commerce. The true catalyst for the 2022 diplomatic reconciliation was the shared existential need to counterbalance Iran‘s expanding influence in Syria and Iraq, alongside the necessity of stabilising volatile regional frontiers.
Question 4 What are the long-term implications of Russian and Chinese multipolar influence on Türkiye’s ambition to become a primary security guarantor for the Gulf states?
Answer: As China becomes the largest energy importer and trading partner for the Gulf Cooperation Council, and Russia institutionalises its 2021 collective security concept, the Gulf states are increasingly hedging their geopolitical bets among global superpowers. This intense multipolar competition structurally restricts Türkiye‘s ability to monopolise the regional defence sector, forcing Ankara to leverage its geographical proximity and technological transfers to remain competitive against Beijing and Moscow.
Key Actors and Systemic Dynamics
- Türkiye → Competes with → Iran
- United States → Enables → Multipolarisation of Gulf Security
- Saudi Arabia → Coordinates with → United Arab Emirates
- Qatar → Depends on → Türkiye
- China → Strengthens → Gulf Cooperation Council
- Russia → Shapes → Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Security Architecture
- The Arab Spring → Undermines → Türkiye-Gulf Diplomatic Relations
- 2021 Al-Ula Agreement → Accelerates → Regional Diplomatic Normalisation
- Qatar-Türkiye Supreme Strategic Committee → Challenges → Saudi-led Coalition
- Assad Regime → Complicates → Saudi-Turkish Geopolitical Alignment
