The Development Road Project, a striking symbol of the deepening partnership between Türkiye and Iraq, is making waves at a time when regional connectivity is more crucial than ever in global geopolitics. Spanning 1,200 km from Gwadar Port in the Persian Gulf, through Iraq, and into Türkiye before reaching European markets, this ambitious route is set to cost around $25 billion. With the first phase slated for completion by 2028, this project is gaining popularity among other regional partners including the UAE and Qatar.
The long-term economic and geopolitical implications of the Development Road Project are striking, especially when we consider the current global landscape. We live through a period where regional conflicts increasingly disrupt the flow of goods and services. The ongoing war in Ukraine and the war in Gaza highlight the crucial role of trade routes. Disruptions like the Houthis’ blockade of the Red Sea and the European Union’s ban on Russian gas only amplify this urgency.
On top of that, the growing power struggle between the U.S. and China, marked by the launch of the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) as a Western counter to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has added yet another layer to the complexity. While IMEC, which has bypassed Türkiye, remains largely theoretical, Turkish authorities have proactively enhanced theircollaboration with Iraq and advanced the Development Road Project. This project showcases Türkiye’s ability to leverage its prime geographic location, propose turn-key alternatives, complete with the infrastructure and feasibility to build them form the ground up.
The Development Road is emerging as the top contender for ships journeying from China to Europe, offering the most feasible alternative among existing routes. While the Southern Corridor via the Suez Canal takes around 35 days and the Cape of Good Hope route stretches to 45 days, the Development Road is projected to reduce that travel time to just 25 days.
But it is not just about reduction of the time span. On the plus side, the Development Road also holds significant geopolitical advantages in a world fraught with global crises and regional conflicts. Take the IMEC route, for instance. Billed as the latest chapter in the U.S.-China rivalry, this project was talked up with some enthusiasm at the G7 Summit in June as part of the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII). However, with Israel’s ongoing war on Gaza and its potential to escalate regionally, IMEC remains more theory than reality. Plus, it has not moved beyond a few memorandums of understanding between some stakeholders like Greece and India. Also, within the intensifying rivalry between the U.S. and China, India, a BRICS+ member may not exactly be eager to bandwagon with the U.S. The most apparent indicator of this factor is that India has a keen interest in partnering with Iran, an archenemy of the U.S., in regional connectivity projects that will benefit Russia, another U.S. nemesis, in the International North-South Transit Corridor (INSTC). Also, India inked a 10-year deal to develop and operate a strategic Iranian port, Chabahar, meaning that ties with non-American partners are groomed byIndia when it comes to economic gains and strategic assets.
Meanwhile, the Suez Canal route is facing its own set of challenges. Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have severely disrupted traffic through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, causing UAE’s port operator, DP Port, to suffer a staggering 60% drop in revenue recently. With no clear end to this instability in sight, big logistics firms are hesitant to prefer this route that costs high levels of risk premiums.
When discussing the Iraq-Türkiye segment of the Development Road, two significant issues come to the forefront. The first is the security risk posed by PKK terrorism. There’s growing optimism surrounding Türkiye-Iraq cooperation, especially in light of Ankara’s counterterrorism efforts. Unlike in the past, Türkiye is no longer facing the same level of criticism or misunderstanding in its cross-border operations. As the two countries deepen their collaboration, this cooperation could potentially evolve into intelligence sharing and even joint military operations.
The second issue is Iran’s uncertain stance on the Development Road project. Iran has shown little support or interest, viewing the project as a potential competitor. Despite positive efforts by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who has stated Ankara’s openness for Iran to join as a partner, Tehran remains cautious. If Iran perceives the strengthening Türkiye-Iraq relationship as a threat to its regional influence, Türkiye must multiply the confidence-building measures to alter such an erroneousperception. However, should Iran-backed Shia militias attempt to disrupt the project, Ankara has no other choice but to defend its interests; a resolve it has routinely demonstrated in combating the PKK terror group.
Overall, the Development Road is progressively outpacing its alternatives and once finished, is poised to become a vital corridor linking the Gulf to Europe. Meanwhile, IMEC, as a manifestation of U.S.-China competition, may not appeal to partners wary of entanglement in this geopolitical conflict. Additionally, Israel’s War on Gaza introduces further instability and unpredictability to the Suez route. In this light, the alternative route that Türkiye is promoting through the Development Road is becoming increasingly compelling.
