Two months ago, in a series of drone attacks on the American base at Tower 22 in Jordan, 3 American military personnel lost their lives, and over 40 others were injured. This episode marked a notable shift from previous Iran-backed militia attacks, which typically targeted the vicinity of American bases to no great effect. One week later, President Biden greenlit retaliatory strikes in Iraq and Syria, hitting Iranian-backed militias, as well as IRGC military facilities and some intelligence centres. Despite Republican complaints about a perceived erosion of U.S. deterrence, the underlying reality remains unchanged: U.S. tensions with Iran are meticulously choreographed.
Iran and the U.S.: Dangerous Liaisons
Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) criticised Biden’s decision to initiate the retaliatory strikes a week later as a sign of weakened American deterrence. However, the Biden administration framed the one-week delay as strategic planning to eliminate the roots of these terror hubs. Yet, after a series of U.S. bombardments, no major harm was done to the capabilities of pro-Iranian militia leaders, aside from killing the senior leader of Kataib Hezbollah, Abu Baqir al-Saadi, via a U.S. drone strike in Baghdad on February 7. Therefore, Washington conveyed the following tacit message to Iran-backed militias: “You’ve crossed a red line, and I will need revenge, but you have a week to flee.” Still, many observers highlighted the rather weak response of the White House.
Regarding the current state of American deterrence in the region, Ali Bakir, a professor at Qatar University and a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and Middle East Programs, stated, “Deterrence is supposed to prevent the supposed adversary from taking hostile action against you fearing the potential consequences. The fact that the US is under continuous targeting means that the supposed deterrence does not work. Some observers argue that the US is following deterrence by punishment, but obviously, this also is not working given that Iran’s proxies seem undeterred. One problem with this type of thinking is that you cannot apply conventional deterrence designed to deter states on non-state actors. The only way this would work is to apply it on Iran rather than its proxies, and the US is not doing this because deterrence would require at a certain point a true will to go for war, something that the US is not willing to do right now”.
Renowned American sociologist Charles Tilly describes the sociological roots of the birth of the modern state using a catchy term – “protection racket.” According to this analogy, the organism we call the state first markets a threat perception to a specific populace then offers them protection, and, in return, obtains the status of a state along with the associated privileges of monopolized use of means of violence at its hands.
The dual relationship between the U.S. and Iran can be likened to this analogy, as Iran’s regional franchises continue their violent actions, giving the impression that they support the Palestinian resistance in Gaza. Iran likes to ascertain the myth that it is the only power that frightens Israel and resists U.S. hegemony in the Middle East. Meanwhile, these same actions provide justifications to the U.S./ Israel axis to conduct additional military interventions in the region.
Therefore, Biden’s reluctance to engage in war with Iran stems from a desire to preserve the protection racket mechanism, not from any spirit of benevolence. The one-week gap between the attacks in Jordan and the U.S. retaliatory strike raises the question of why the sole source feeding all Shia militias, namely Iran, is not targeted.
But then again, the situation is complex and multifaceted. Dr. Bakir observes, “An all-out direct confrontation between the US and Iran is highly unlikely unless it happens as a part of unintended escalation, or the US is dragged to it by another actor such as Israel, which involves miscalculation in both cases. On the one hand, the US does not have the appetite to wage a new war in the region as this would be considered another distraction for it vis-à-vis rising global challenges from Russia and China. On the other hand, the Iranian regime is not suicidal and not in a position to withstand an all-out direct war with the US given its weak conventional forces.” This means that the “pivot to Asia” will be a significant determinant in the future global power politics for the US, and understanding its policy towards the Middle East without considering this approach would not be accurate.
In this outlook, the so-called ‘Axis of Resistance’ is highly problematic for the U.S. posture in the region. This axis, which was labelled by a RAND report the “Iran Threat Network” (ITN), receives financial support, intelligence, and weapons from Tehran. Through these franchises, Iran has maintained a web of proxies that widen its expansionist aims in the region.
Paradoxically, Washington not only coexisted with Iran’s constellation of surrogates but empowered it as exemplified in post-Saddam Iraq. Therefore, many see the U.S. and Iran as more of an inseparable duo: One fans the flames of crises while the other plays the firefighter role.
Trump’s revelation about the assassination of Qasem Soleimani provides a case in point. In the aftermath of the assassination, Iranians contacted Trump, asserting the necessity of retaliation, and intriguingly added, “Don’t be concerned. We will launch 18 missiles at your military base, but none of them will hit the base.” Unsurprisingly, this prompted the U.S. to send an additional 3000 troops to the Middle East, leveraging heightened insecurity as the rationale.
The US strategy has reached its limits
The ‘protection racket’ business may be coming to a close as the regional conflict becomes one of existential philosophies. The Iranians are seeking to expand their footprint and make their presence in other theatres (Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon) permanent; a move that requests the removal of US troops and bases from the region. They also pursue a new Persian Gulf security paradigm that excludes the Americans and operates under Chinese-Russian mediation. This new environment would allow them to free themselves from Western pressures, and the establishment of a permanent Palestinian solution.
The Americans are still aspiring to build Pax Americana in the Middle East, to impose strategic directives on non-sovereign states, control energy outflows and pricing, dominate strategic waterways, maintain a strong and undefeatable Israel, keep the issue of Palestinian statehood mired in “process,” rein in Iran’s military technology, and keep Tehran’s regional influence at bay.
What’s next?
While Biden’s policies are to reassert US hegemony in the Middle East, the growing possibility of a Trump return to the White House suggests that Washington may turn to a more transactional approach in the region. That could mean at least a partial US exit from conflict zones in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, and the establishment of new regional security arrangements that reduce American capital expenditure. While a Trump presidency may exclude the revival of the JCPOA, the region has ticked on without that deal, and Iran has, in the interim, turned to eastern markets and alliances to ensure its economic growth.
The question at the moment remains how Biden and a non-Trump successor will handle allegations that US deterrence is waning in the Middle East. The White House’s modus operandi, for the foreseeable future, will be to minimise the risk of regional escalation, provide measured military responses to satisfy its electorate, and maintain its ‘protection racket’ for as long as possible.
But the Middle East is at a critical juncture – like the rest of the world. Seismic shifts may render the old operational frameworks redundant. In this new space, can the US continue to capitalize on cheap Machiavellian schemes and outdated threat-and-strike tactics – while rapprochement between long-time foes is being struck under the auspices of rising eastern powers? For how long can the US administration attack non-state actors without addressing its real worry, Iran? Will Russia, China, and other major players accept a war on Iran? What of the US’s regional allies – like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE – who see stability in energy markets and waterways to keep their economies afloat?
Washington needs a bottom-up reassessment of its value to the Middle East, given the regional perception of the US’s waning deterrence capabilities, its inability to solve problems, and its partiality to military conflict. This reassessment should be shaped as a less compartmentalized, more holistic approach, call it if you will, opening a new page in the Middle East.
