In an era of growing multipolarity, the absence of a single dominant power capable of setting and enforcing global trade norms has created a more fluid—and therefore more unpredictable—connectivity landscape. Strategic corridors are now shaped by shifting coalitions, transactional alignments, and competing infrastructure visions, each with its conditionalities and timelines. This diffusion of power means that routes once considered stable can quickly become contested, rerouted, or subjected to new political leverage. For countries like India, this uncertainty requires constant recalibration of partnerships and investments to avoid entanglement in the rivalries of larger powers.
As the world’s fifth-largest economic anchor with a GDP of $3.91 trillion and a maritime heavyweight in the Indo-Pacific, India has established its presence at the starting points of two high-profile connectivity initiatives: India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) and International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). Yet, it draws a clear red line when it comes to China’s flagship China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project. India’s geostrategic location along the Asia-Europe trade axis also solidifies its role as a vital node in the global trade corridor architecture.
From that standpoint, India’s selective embrace of connectivity speaks volumes about how regional powers may navigate an increasingly multipolar world. Caught between the competing orbits of Washington and Beijing as the great power rivalry deepens, India is trying to pursue an in-between strategy that maximises flexibility while minimising risk. However, this balancing act, which might be seen as a wise and risk-averse course of action, may soon face turbulence. As the Trump administration doubles down on its trademark unpredictability, as seen in tariff threats and provocative rhetoric, New Delhi’s carefully carved strategic room begins to close in quickly. This may help us better understand that growing multipolarity would bring growing unpredictability.
Connectivity: The Way India Views the World
India’s bid to position itself at the very heart of global trade corridors or critical nodes along their routes speaks volumes about how it sees the world. Such projects are not just about infrastructure; they are symbols of the cooperative potential India seeks to unlock in an era defined by a shift toward multipolarity. In this emerging global balance of power, New Delhi clings firmly to principles like being risk-averse, benefit-maximising, and steadfastly multilateral, using economic relationships to build diplomatic bridges.
From the lens of Sino-American great-power competition, India’s strategy is striking in its breadth. On one hand, it is a member of BRICS+, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), groupings often cast as alternatives to the existing international order. On the other hand, it actively participates in U.S.-led initiatives such as the Quad, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), I2U2, and the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII). That it is also the starting point of the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) alongside Russia and Iran underscores how deeply multilateralism is woven into its foreign-policy agenda.
This web of partnerships—which could be listed and expanded at length—points to the same conclusion: India’s reading of global politics is that of a power which favours multipolarity and practices a flexible multilateralism, one that is pragmatic enough to engage even with U.S. adversaries like Iran and Russia if the returns are worthwhile. In this worldview, connectivity projects are not just logistical ventures; they are vehicles that translate multilateralism into concrete outcomes by marrying it with economic incentives.
IMEC: Flagship but Fragile
IMEC, unveiled at the 2023 G20 Summit in New Delhi, is a case in point. The plan envisions a multimodal trade route linking a select group of European and Gulf partners, along with Israel. Though its momentum appears to have slowed following the outbreak of the Israel–Hamas war on October 7, 2023, IMEC remains a flagship element of India’s regional and global connectivity vision. It is, in many ways, an expanded form of the I2U2 initiative designed to accelerate Arab–Israeli normalisation.
India remains firmly committed to the project, actively shaping the narrative around it. Through English- and Urdu-language digital media, academic output, and television programming, New Delhi has sought to imbue IMEC with a sense of ground-breaking promise and forward-looking optimism. On the diplomatic front, India is bolstering the project’s foundation with complementary arrangements—from multi-layered agreements with Greece to a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with the UAE—using trade and partial free-trade pacts to keep its brand of pragmatic, multilateral multipolarity alive on the global stage.
INSTC and Chabahar: Maximum Utility Meets Maximum Risk
On the other hand, India’s participation in the INSTC — a 7200 km trade corridor that includes Iran and Russia — and its signing of a 10-year deal with Tehran for the development and operation of Chabahar Port reveal the maximally utilitarian side of New Delhi’s appetite for multilateralism. India has already invested $120 million in the port and allocated a $250 million credit line to Iran in the process. Previously, under the pretext of supporting Afghanistan’s reconstruction and fostering greater regional economic growth, Washington had exempted Chabahar-related transactions from sanctions under Section 1244 of the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCA). Yet under the Trump administration, the possibility of re-imposing these sanctions has been frequently raised and even advised by FDD in a recent piece — a move widely interpreted as part of Washington’s “maximum pressure” policy on Iran. The White House made this explicit in the February 2025 National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2), pledging to “modify or rescind sanctions waivers, particularly those that provide Iran any degree of economic or financial relief, including those related to Iran’s Chabahar port project,” even also aiming at making the export of Iranian oil zero— a measure that would affect even China’s purchases. As a crucial node of the INSTC, Chabahar Port also serves India’s strategic goal of countering the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). But if the scope of sanctions is expanded, India will inevitably feel the impact of Trump’s Iran policy.
CPEC: The Permanent Red Line
When it comes to the competitive dynamics of connectivity, India’s foreign and geopolitical posture is marked by unwavering opposition to CPEC. The corridor — the flagship of China’s Belt and Road Initiative with an estimated $62 billion cost — is of long-term strategic significance to Beijing. It is designed as an alternative route to mitigate the so-called “Malacca Dilemma,” the vulnerability that a potential maritime blockade could cut off China’s trade flows, particularly its energy imports.
For India, the CPEC passes through Gilgit-Baltistan, a region at the heart of its territorial dispute with Pakistan, and threatens to raise Pakistan’s strategic standing — both reasons enough for firm resistance. New Delhi has even opposed recent China-mediated diplomatic engagements between Afghanistan and Pakistan, voicing its disapproval of any move to integrate Afghanistan into CPEC. Most recently, the United States designated the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) — a major security threat to CPEC infrastructure and Chinese personnel in the region — as a terrorist organisation, a move welcomed by Islamabad. This designation enables closer monitoring of the BLA’s regional and global activities. The removal of such a security risk, combined with an effective counterterrorism strategy, if achieved, could significantly accelerate CPEC’s completion — an outcome detrimental to India’s interests.
However, interpreting Washington’s stance on CPEC as inherently hostile to India would be a flawed reading. The underlying driver here is the positive trajectory in U.S.–Pakistan relations and the Trump administration’s hard-line stance on Iran, not a direct intent to undermine New Delhi — even if the outcomes may ultimately run counter to India’s strategic goals. What remains clear is that CPEC is a project of immense importance to China, and Beijing will spare no effort to see it through.
Limits of India’s Multipolar Ambitions
Connectivity allows India to keep its strategic options open, but that flexibility has boundaries. The Trump administration could push those boundaries inward. Revocation of Chabahar waivers would close a critical outlet. Framing IMEC purely as a Belt and Road counter risks dragging India into direct great-power rivalry, forcing compromises that carry economic and diplomatic costs.
As the U.S.–China rivalry becomes the dominant organising principle of international politics, the space for pragmatic multilateralism narrows. The very adaptability that India prizes is vulnerable to being squeezed between competing demands. For now, India sees the dividends connectivity can yield. But in a world where trade routes are hostage to sanctions, tariffs, and transactional deals, multipolarity may prove less a pathway to autonomy than a test of survival. This is not a hypothetical risk. In August 2025, the Trump administration imposed a combined 50% tariff on Indian goods—partly in retaliation for New Delhi’s growing purchases of discounted Russian oil, which now account for nearly 40% of its imports. U.S. officials have warned of further secondary tariffs if Trump’s talks with Vladimir Putin on Ukraine fail, a move that would undercut India’s economic resilience and the strategic flexibility it seeks through its multipolar engagement.
In today’s fractured world, India’s strategy of playing all sides is starting to look less like masterful diplomacy and more like a high-wire act without a safety net. As U.S.–China rivalry hardens into the organising principle of global politics, the breathing room for true multipolar engagement is vanishing. Trump’s tariffs and sanctions are not just policy tools—they are political weapons, aimed to force compliance. For India, the question is no longer whether it can keep all doors open, but how long it can keep from being shoved through one of them, bringing into mind Ophelia’s line from Hamlet: “Lord, we know what we are, but not what we may be.”
