When NATO leaders gather in Ankara on 7–8 July 2026, they will do so in a markedly different strategic environment. The summit takes place amid profound uncertainty about the future of the transatlantic bargain. Questions surrounding American commitment, European military preparedness and Russia’s long-term intentions have transformed what might otherwise have been a routine gathering into a test of NATO’s ability to adapt to a changing strategic landscape.
In the aftermath of the failed July 2016 coup attempt, several European policymakers openly questioned Türkiye’s place within the alliance, arguing that Ankara’s increasingly autonomous foreign policy was diverging from Western priorities. The decision to remove Türkiye from the F-35 programme following its acquisition of the Russian-made S-400 air defence system further underscored the extent of this estrangement.
Ankara’s Strategic Calculus Paid Off
Fast forward ten years and Ankara’s strategic calculus appears considerably more vindicated. Turkish interventions in Libya, Azerbaijan and Syria have demonstrated a willingness—and an ability—to defend national interests independently when required. At the same time, Türkiye has transformed itself into a major defence producer. Defence exports reached approximately $10 billion in 2025, reflecting the maturation of an indigenous defence ecosystem that now spans drones, naval platforms, armoured vehicles, missile systems and advanced electronics. However,export figures only tell part of the story. As NATO’s second-largest military, Türkiye brings capabilities that extend well beyond commercial metrics.
Türkiye’s strategic importance to NATO has become increasingly difficult to ignore. As custodian of the Black Sea gateway, interlocutor with Russia, supporter of Ukraine, and frontline state exposed to the turbulence of the Middle East. Ankara also sits at the intersection of several of the Alliance’s most persistent security challenges, including migration pressures, instability in Syria and Iraq, maritime competition in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the protection of critical energy corridors.
Ankara, thus, occupies a geopolitical position few allies can replicate. It is also no longer merely a recipient of collective security but an increasingly capable provider of it, underpinned by a rapidly expanding defence-industrial base. States with such assets rarely act as passive stakeholders. Their interests do not always align neatly with some other allies, and disagreements are inevitable. Nevertheless, strategic friction is often less a symptom of alienation than a consequence of importance. In Türkiye’s case, it reflects a country whose influence within the alliance has become too significant to be taken for granted.
A Larger Turkish Role
The question facing the Ankara Summit is therefore not whether Türkiye matters within NATO, but whether the alliance is prepared to accommodate a larger Turkish role at its core. Such a development should not be interpreted as Ankara subordinating its broader strategic interests to alliance priorities. Rather, a more central role within NATO would likely enhance Türkiye’s capacity to defend its interests from within the alliance itself.
Washington appears increasingly aware of this reality. The Trump administration recently notified Congress of plans to authorise the sale of jet engines valued at more than $700 million to Türkiye, while senior officials have signalled openness to revisiting the question of F-35 sales despite lingering opposition within parts of the U.S. national security establishment. These gestures suggest a broader effort to anchor Ankara more firmly within the Western security architecture.
However, the Ankara Summit is not merely about Türkiye’s place within NATO. It also offers an opportunity to redefine the Alliance’s strategic compact around three imperatives: keeping the Americans committed, enhancing Europe’s defence posture, and keeping the Russians contained.
Keeping the Americans Committed
For NATO’s European members, preserving American engagement requires demonstrating that the Alliance remains a strategic asset rather than a security subsidy. Burden-sharing has long dominated transatlantic debates, but the argument for continued U.S. commitment ultimately extends beyond defence spending targets. As former NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg recently observed, the United States accounts for roughly a quarter of global GDP, yet together with Europe and Canada, the Alliance represents half of global economic output and military power. In an era of renewed great-power competition, few geopolitical arrangements offer Washington a comparable concentration of allies, capabilities, and strategic geography.
Europe’s value to the United States also lies in its position on the front lines of Russian power projection. The Nordic and Baltic regions, together with NATO’s eastern flank, serve as an indispensable component of American homeland security. The Kola Peninsula hosts one of the world’s largest concentrations of Russian strategic assets, including nuclear submarines, bombers, and missile systems directed not towards Oslo, Helsinki, or Warsaw, but ultimately towards North America. European allies provide forward intelligence, early warning capabilities, maritime surveillance, and strategic depth that would be difficult and costly for the United States to replicate independently.
At the same time, sustaining American commitment requires Europeans to respond to a long-standing bipartisan demand emanating from Washington: assume greater responsibility for the continent’s conventional defence. Recent increases in defence spending suggest that Europe is beginning to move in this direction, but financial commitments alone will not suffice. They must translate into deployable forces, industrial capacity, resilient supply chains, and credible deterrence.
The challenge for Ankara is therefore twofold. First, to reassure Washington that NATO remains essential to American security interests. Second, to demonstrate that European allies are finally prepared to shoulder a greater share of the burden. If burden-sharing was once the principal source of transatlantic friction, it may now become the strongest argument for preserving the Alliance’s cohesion in an era of strategic uncertainty.
Strengthening Europe’s Defence Posture
For NATO’s European members, burden-sharing can no longer remain a rhetorical commitment. Despite recent increases in defence spending, the United States still provides the backbone of deterrence on NATO’s eastern flank. Of the approximately 25,000 personnel deployed across NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) battle groups in Eastern Europe, around 15,000 are American troops, while more than 80,000 US military personnel remain stationed across Europe. This imbalance is becoming increasingly difficult to justify politically, particularly amid growing calls in Washington for Europeans to assume greater responsibility for their own defence.
Progress has been made. Germany is establishing a brigade in Lithuania, Canada leads a multinational formation in Latvia, and the United Kingdom maintains the framework force in Estonia. Yet, deployments remain fragmented, under-resourced, and slower than the strategic environment demands. The Ankara Summit offers an opportunity for European allies to demonstrate resolve by committing to deploy fully operational brigade-sized formations across the Baltic region by 2027. Such formations should be fully equipped, mechanised, interoperable, and capable of sustained operations, reducing dependence on American reinforcements while strengthening deterrence against potential Russian adventurism. More importantly, they would signal to Washington that Europe is finally prepared to translate its growing defence expenditures into credible military capability.
Keeping the Russians Contained
Containment in the twenty-first century is less about recreating Cold War-era military postures than adapting to a landscape defined by interconnected vulnerabilities. NATO’s challenge extends beyond defending territory to safeguarding the strategic arteries that underpin modern security: maritime routes, energy infrastructure, digital networks, and critical supply chains. This requires a credible mix of deterrence, resilience, and strategic signalling, encompassing a stronger presence in the Baltic and Black Sea theatres, expanded missile-defence capabilities, greater cyber preparedness, and improved protection of undersea assets.
At the same time, containment must preserve channels for dialogue and crisis management. Its purpose is not to institutionalise confrontation, but to minimise opportunities for coercion, reduce the risk of escalation, and ensure that any attempt to exploit divisions within the Alliance carries unacceptable costs.
The Ankara Summit is already being described as “NATO 3.0”; a rebalanced alliance in which Europe assumes greater responsibility for conventional defence while the United States remains NATO’s strategic anchor. The gathering is less about reinventing the Alliance than adapting it to a changing geopolitical landscape—one in which American primacy is increasingly contested, Europe is relearning the language of hard power, and Türkiye has emerged as one of NATO’s indispensable strategic pivots.
