The June 2025 clashes with Israel laid bare not only the limits of Iran’s military power but also the vulnerability of its regime. Struggling to defend even its own capital, Tehran is now scrambling to repair its tarnished image abroad and reinforce its defences against future strikes. However, this ambition collides with two entrenched obstacles: the suffocating weight of international sanctions and the fractured dual structure of its armed forces—factors that make turning intent into capability far more elusive than Iran might wish.
A Key Structural Deficiency
Iran’s armed forces are divided between the Artesh, a 420,000-strong conventional force, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which has 125,000–190,000 personnel focused on asymmetric warfare. The Artesh Air Force (IRIAF), custodian of Iran’s fighter fleet, has been starved of investment since 1979, while doubts over Artesh loyalty pushed the regime to privilege the IRGC and its missile, drone, and unconventional programs.
This duality is considered one of the most structural deficiencies that the Iranian Revolution created in its defence posture. The Revolutionary Guards were primarily designed for ground warfare, and their limitations in air defence were apparent from the start. Tehran sought to establish deterrence by prioritising short- and long-range missiles, but, as the recent conflict demonstrated, these missiles were developed for offensive purposes and proved largely ineffective in defensive operations.
Iran’s air arsenal remains rooted in ageing U.S. and Soviet aircraft from the 1970s–80s, highlighting the widening technological gap sanctions and isolation have created, and leaving Tehran unable to compete in modern aerial warfare. At times, the Iranian leadership aspired to modernise its air force through limited acquisitions. However, the structural rivalry between the Artesh and the IRGC prevents these platforms from being used to their full potential.
The existing bifurcation results in duplication of effort, competition for funding, and a lack of unified training or command integration. The result is that even if Iran acquires advanced fighters, they risk being underutilised in a fragmented system where doctrinal coherence is sacrificed for institutional rivalry.
12-Day War Exposed the Dire Situation
This vulnerability became evident during the 12-day war. The Israeli military used sophisticated F-35 fighter jets in conjunction with integrated intelligence and special operations to take down Iran’s air defence systems, radar, and command-and-control infrastructure. Key nuclear facilities and ballistic missile installations were also hit, destroying about 30 percent of Iran’s operational air fleet. Israel inflicted this heavy damage with minimal losses, which revealed that Tehran could not gain air superiority nor put up an effective defence against a similar adversary.
This severe setback has compelled Iran to pursue urgent modernisation. Comprehensive sanctions imposed by the United States and the West have greatly restricted Iran’s defence procurement options, rendered access to Western technology nearly impossible, and complicated even non-Western agreements.
Iran, which has been attempting to procure Su-35 fighter jets from Russia—regarded as an ally in recent years—has received no response, despite having supplied thousands of Shahid-136 UAVs and missiles in support of the Ukraine conflict. Delays in expected deliveries and technology transfers from Russia have prompted Iran to seek alternative suppliers.
The J-10C Option
China and Iran’s first meeting was actually done in 2015 when Iran approached China to purchase 150 Chengdu J-10C fighter jets. However, due to economic sanctions and restrictions, China rejected Iran’s offer to settle the debt in oil.
Following the 2025 attacks, Iranian Defence Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh’s visit to China at the end of June accelerated high-level discussions regarding the J-10C aircraft. Iran has reportedly ordered 40 planes in the short term, with the expectation that the number will increase to 150 in the longer term. Additionally, it has been implied that early warning planes are to be part of the package. Realistic estimates suggest that actual deliveries will likely be limited to around 50–100 aircraft.
The potential acquisition of Chinese J-10C fighters could, in theory, modestly improve Iran’s air posture. Compared to Iran’s ageing fleet of Phantoms and Tomcats, the J-10C offers advanced avionics, an AESA radar, and compatibility with modern air-to-air missiles, such as the PL-15, thereby extending Iran’s engagement range beyond its current capabilities. Furthermore, the purchase would provide an opportunity to re-establish a more modern training pipeline for pilots and maintenance crews, potentially raising operational readiness after decades of stagnation. In short, the J-10C could close some of the most glaring technological gaps that have long undermined Iran’s ability to deter or contest hostile air forces.
Yet these gains remain narrowly tactical rather than transformative. Iran’s procurement capacity is too limited to field J-10Cs in numbers sufficient to offset Israel’s advanced F-35s or the vast superiority of U.S. airpower. Training bottlenecks, sanctions on spare parts, and the chronic rivalry between the IRGC and Artesh would further constrain the effective integration of these jets into a coherent doctrine. Most importantly, while platforms like the J-10C may narrow the technological gap on paper, they cannot compensate for Iran’s systemic weaknesses in command and control, pilot training depth, or joint operations. For these reasons, J-10Cs may give Tehran a temporary morale boost, but they do little to alter the underlying asymmetry that defines Iran’s airpower deficit.
Why China?
The economic and military pressure exerted by the United States has significantly influenced China’s approach to Iran during this period. Dissatisfied with this pressure, the Chinese administration has adjusted its policy regarding the sharing of weapons and technological equipment with friendly countries. Ministry of National Defence spokesperson Jiang Bin recently said that China is prudent in its military exports and is open to sharing its equipment developments with friendly nations. He also added that some countries are in talks with China for procurement plans for the J-10 fighter aircraft. Beijing’s primary motivation is to support these nations in countering the United States in various regions and to balance Washington’s focus on the Asia-Pacific.
A further factor driving Iran into China’s arms is the J-10C’s proven performance in the May 2025 India-Pakistan conflict. During the May 2025 conflict, Pakistan Air Force J-10Cs armed with PL-15 missiles shot down India’s Rafale fighters, marking the first combat losses ever suffered by the Rafale aircraft. Priced at a unit cost of $40–50 million, the fighter is an attractive option for Iran, boasting an AESA radar and beyond-visual-range missile capability.
Winter is Coming
Since the 12-day war in June 2025, Iran has described the current situation as ‘not a ceasefire, but an ongoing phase of active hostilities.’ By August 2025, the Iranian military is restocking missile inventories, and top leaders are using language indicating a ‘final war.’ Planning has involved drills for responding to Israeli strikes, naval exercises, and increased coordination with proxy forces. Although these actions are meant to project strength, they are unlikely to alter the balance of power in the short term.
With the regional situation being unfavourable to Tehran, Israel has resumed strikes against Iranian proxies such as the Houthis and has replenished its military stockpiles following the June 2025 war. The actions of both states indicate that each sees conflict as inevitable.
In sum, Iran’s dash for new fighters may grab headlines, but it doesn’t change the fundamentals. J-10Cs can patch over gaps in radar range and missile reach, but they cannot fix broken doctrine, shallow pilot training, or the poisonous rivalry between the IRGC and Artesh. Without unity of command and real investment in airpower, these jets will remain more showroom trophies than war-winning tools.
