The escalation of Iran-Israel tensions through a flurry of missile exchanges and direct U.S. involvement marked yet another tectonic shift in Middle Eastern security in June. Triggered by classical allegations that Iran was on the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons, the “pre-emptive”strikes unfolded intensely over two weeks. Though brief, this surge in hostilities represents yet another contentious chapter for the region’s geopolitics, which has grown increasingly fragile since October 7, 2023.
At the same time, recent developments have sparked widespread speculation and uncertainty about the future of Gulf connectivity. Still, assuming an entirely bleak outlook would amount to undue pessimism. A more grounded assessment requires a clear understanding of the recent escalation and a realistic projection of how state and non-state regional actors involved in the conflict are likely to proceed.
Recent events have underscored a vital truth: Gulf connectivity is simply too important to be allowed to fail. While caution is warranted—geopolitical tensions are never far from the surface—the vision of a deeply interconnected Gulf remains a strategic priority for all stakeholders, even for those who act as spoilers.
Two Competing Visions for the Gulf Connectivity: IMEC and Development Road
To assess the claim that growing insecurity within the Iran-Israel-U.S. triangle will derail Gulf connectivity, it is of practical importance to examine major planned trade corridors—specifically, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) and the Development Road Project, both of which traverse the region. IMEC is a multimodal connectivity initiative involving India, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan, Israel, and the European Union. The Development Road, by contrast, is a project rooted in the deepening cooperation between Türkiye and Iraq, with Gulf partners such as Qatar and the UAE also participants.
IMEC envisions a trade route starting from Indian ports, traversing the Gulf of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz to reach UAE ports, and then connecting overland via rail and road to Saudi Arabia and Jordan, before reaching Israel’s Haifa Port, ultimately linking to European markets via the Mediterranean. The Development Road, on the other hand, begins at Iraq’s Al Faw Port on the Persian Gulf and moves overland through Iraq into Türkiye, where it continues toward Europe via an integrated network of road, rail, and maritime transport. The involvement of Gulf stakeholders such as Qatar and the UAE adds momentum to the project by strengthening interstate connectivity and facilitating investment, especially given that the project has already passed key stages of construction.
While IMEC has been framed by some as a reflection of U.S.-China great power competition—posing a challenge to China’s expanding infrastructure network under the Belt and Road Initiative—it also risks being perceived by Gulf countries, known for their multi-alignment strategies, as a zero-sum proposition: you’re either with us or with the other side. In contrast, the Development Road stands out as a more feasible and inclusive alternative, which calls for Iran to be a stakeholder. Grounded in the joint vision of Türkiye and Iraq, the project carries the potential to generate broader regional prosperity, especially as more countries join in. Integrated with the Middle Corridor, the Development Road could meaningfully contribute to China-Europe trade flows as a time-saving alternative. Yet at present, IMEC remains a slow-moving initiative, advancing primarily through India’s bilateral agreements with participating states—such as those with the UAE and Greece—and through selective infrastructure upgrades aimed at enhancing intra-Gulf rail and road connectivity.
Iran-Israel tensions and Gulf connectivity
The 12-day war between Iran and Israel sparked renewed speculation about the future of regional connectivity, particularly fears that Iran might sabotage key trade routes and strategic checkpoints—either directly through the IRGC or via proxies such as Lebanese Hezbollah and the Yemen-based Houthis. These concerns were grounded in historical precedents. The Houthis’ attacks on maritime traffic in the Red Sea were cited as a reference point, alongside the persistent risk of a potential blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. Analysts interpreted this scenario as a deliberate weaponisation of energy security.
It is worthwhile to note that it was Israel that first deliberately targeted Iran’s energy infrastructure—specifically its June 14 2025, strike on the South Pars gas field, the world’s largest and the source of two-thirds of Iran’s domestic gas supply. This action revealed a calculated gambit: provoke Tehran into closing the Strait of Hormuz and thus drag the U.S. into direct conflict. Yet Iran’s retaliation defied expectations. Rather than escalating at sea, it struck surgically at Israel’s economic lifelines, hitting the Haifa Port—a critical node in the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC). The attack forced Maersk, the global shipping giant, to suspend operations, exposing Israel’s vulnerability.
Meanwhile, the Houthis declared that they would continue targeting this node as long as the naval blockade on Gaza and the war persisted.
In contrast, no direct attack has yet occurred against the route associated with the Development Road project.
Hence, even at the peak of escalation, Iran refrained from closing the Strait of Hormuz—a chokepoint vital to both IMEC and the Development Road. Had Iran mined the waters or enacted a full naval blockade, a global energy crisis would likely have ensued, depending on the duration of the disruption. Although Iran’s parliament even voted in favour of closing the Strait, the move was never executed. Given that nearly 30% of global oil and 20% of global LNG shipments pass through this waterway, its closure would severely harm Gulf Arab economies, but Iran itself would also suffer considerable losses.
It is worth recalling that during the “Tanker War” phase of the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq War, Tehran did not fully close the Strait, even as it launched numerous attacks on Gulf shipping. That period prompted the U.S. to launch Operation Earnest Will to escort Kuwaiti oil tankers, followed by the 1988 Operation Praying Mantis, which inflicted significant damage on Iran’s naval assets and led to a ceasefire at the end. This time around, Iran well knew that any blockade would bring the U.S. to war with Iran in a much harsher way than what it now did.
This historical episode is instructive for understanding the enduring relevance of the 1980 Carter Doctrine. The doctrine asserted that the U.S. would militarily intervene in the Persian Gulf if its vital national interests were threatened. Although later administrations revised its scope, the Carter Doctrine remains relevant because it considers energy security and the security of the state of Israel as red lines. This explains Iran’s persistent hesitation to close the Strait or attack Gulfenergy infrastructure. Though it frequently uses the threat as rhetorical leverage, it has never acted on it.
The June Iran-Israel flare-up heightened regional tensions, but major connectivity projects, such as IMEC and the Development Road, are anchored in long-term strategic goals and are unlikely to be derailed by short-term shocks. While the Gulf and Strait of Hormuz remain vital trade arteries, the actual threat to these routes appears limited. The recent escalation may reflect the upper limits of Iran and its proxies’ ability to disrupt them, as neither the IRGC, Hezbollah, nor the Houthis inflicted serious damage.
On the other hand, Haifa Port, a key node in the IMEC corridor and central to Israel’s regional connectivity, faced direct risks during the escalation, with missile strikes targeting its facilities—including an oil refinery—disrupting energy operations. Despite its strategic importance, the port’s exposure leaves it vulnerable in future conflicts.
The IMEC route from Emirati ports to Israel faces Houthi threats, evidenced by their 2022 strikes in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Future risks hinge on the Houthis’ reach and potential U.S. military responses, highlighted by Ambassador Huckabee’s suggestion of B-2 bomber strikes in Yemen. While the U.S.-brokered Operation Rough Rider ceasefire temporarily reduced hostilities, Hezbollah—weakened by losses in Syria and Israeli strikes—has avoided further escalation, reflecting constrained capabilities rather than restraint.
Thus, we are now dealing with an Iran whose room for manoeuvre is more constrained, and which no longer commands the formidable proxy network it did in the 2010s. This shift requires a recalibration of how we evaluate security risks. Rather than relying on outdated assumptions, threat assessments should reflect Iran’s post–October 7 reality, marked by limited operational capacity and heightened vulnerability in the face of U.S. deterrence.
In sum, the 12 day-war between Iran and Israel tested the resilience of Gulf connectivity but revealed its enduring strategic importance. While IMEC faces vulnerabilities—particularly at Haifa Port—the Development Road emerges as a more inclusive and stable alternative. Iran’s restraint during the crisis, rooted in its awareness of U.S. red lines and its own diminished proxy leverage, suggests that long-term connectivity projects will persist despite short-term volatility.
The key lesson? Gulf trade corridors are too vital to collapse, but good alternatives exist, andtheir future hinges on pragmatic regional cooperation—and a sober, clear-eyed, 360° risk analysis.
