The Development Road Project serves as a powerful symbol of the strengthening economic and infrastructural ties between Türkiye and Iraq, reflecting the broader trend of expanding regional cooperation. As part of a vision to enhance connectivity across the Gulf, this ambitious infrastructure corridor not only bolsters bilateral relations but also contributes to the region’s overall interconnectedness, facilitating trade, mobility, and regional integration.
According to Turkish Transport and Infrastructure Minister Abdulkadir Uraloğlu, the project is now nearly 95% complete. Amid the surge of instability and multidimensional threats in the Middle East following the events of October 7, 2023, this initiative has quietly emerged as a promising additional lifeline for regional connectivity networks.
With final infrastructure preparations underway and financing models under discussion, the Development Road is gaining momentum—not in spite of regional instability, but because of it. In a context where conflict increasingly threatens trade corridors, the project’s feasibility and importance have only grown stronger.
Trade Routes and the Fog of War
From the outbreak of war and regional clashes following October 7, 2023, to the 12-day Iran-Israel conflict in June 2025, one message is clear: key maritime chokepoints in the region, including the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Suez Canal, are highly vulnerable.
These chokepoints are essential arteries for oil exports and global trade. Any disruption sends shockwaves through shipping schedules and pricing mechanisms. While alternative routes exist, they are far from optimal. Rerouting cargo around the Cape of Good Hope can extend delivery times by up to 30 days, fuelling inflationary pressures across global markets due to higher war risk premiums and rising fuel costs.
Take the Strait of Hormuz, for instance. Even though Iran’s parliament voted for the closure of the Strait of Hormuz during its latest conflict with Israel, the waterway remained open. Still, Tehran continues to hint at this possibility through its asymmetric anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) tactics, proving that even the threat of disruption can have outsized consequences. Reduced traffic through the strait, even short of a full closure, could be enough to roil global commerce.
Meanwhile, Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, ongoing since November 2023, have already slashed traffic through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and the Suez Canal and, in some cases, can reach Indian offshore areas.
As nations grow more economically interconnected, the outbreak of full-scale conflict poses serious threats to global commerce, turning this very interconnectedness into a weapon.
A Viable Alternative in Risky Waters
The post-October 7, 2023, landscape has disrupted not only politics but also the very vision of regional connectivity in the Gulf. For instance, once a bold line was drawn confidently on paper from India to the Piraeus Port of Greece, today IMEC is mired in bilateral diplomacy and intra-Gulf logistical hurdles that are costly and time-consuming to resolve.
IMEC isn’t dead. As a symbol of a wider American project of Arab-Israeli normalisation, bolstered by the I2U2 partnership and the Abraham Accords, it still holds promise. But on the ground, expectations are being lowered. The UAE, a major cornerstone of the IMEC project, signed an MoU with Türkiye and Iraq to become part of the Development Road last year.
The Development Road, stretching from the Gulf through Iraq and Türkiye, all the way to Europe, offers a straightforward solution. For Gulf countries like the UAE and Qatar, this route provides multiple options, helping to reduce risks and diversify connectivity platforms in the face of geopolitical uncertainty and an increased risk of the weaponisation of connectivity.
Moreover, the security outlook for the Development Road has noticeably improved. Türkiye’s new counterterrorism campaign under the banner of a “Terror-Free Türkiye” has significantly diminished the PKK’s disruptive capabilities, pushing it toward disarmament. This shift not only improves the project’s risk profile but also injects fresh momentum into Ankara-Baghdad relations.
Similarly, when it comes to Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), often viewed through the lens of Iran’s influence, there’s room for cautious optimism. As the PMF becomes increasingly embedded in Iraq’s national framework, its incentives are shifting. Sabotaging a high-potential economic project like the Development Road is no longer in its interest.
The continuous reduction of security threats makes the Development Road one of the safest and strategic alternatives in the region’s web of connectivity. Greater interest from key regional players, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, could further expand the project’s scope, responding to the Gulf’s need for secure and diversified trade routes. Additionally, the potential integration of the Development Road with the Middle Corridor connectivity could open a new artery in the global connectivity map, attracting other countries to engage in the route through various means of integration and collaboration.
