The joint US-Israeli strike that killed Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has removed a key pillar upon which the Islamic Republic’s political and ideological edifice rested. The smoke rising over Tehran signals more than the destruction of military assets; it marks a geopolitical rupture whose aftershocks will redraw the Middle East’s strategic map. For nearly four decades, Khamenei functioned as both the theological compass and command nerve of the “Axis of Resistance.” His elimination, alongside family members and top military commanders, has plunged the Iranian circles of power into an existential crisis, forcing a leadership scramble amid aerial bombings and open Israel/US calls for the system’s overthrow.
While Iran’s constitutional mechanisms have engaged almost immediately, the reality on the ground is less straight forward. Officially, a temporary Leadership Council has been formed to assume all duties of the Supreme Leader until the 88-member Assembly of Experts can select a permanent successor. This tripartite body comprises the reformist President Masoud Pezeshkian, hardline Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, and Ayatollah Alireza Arafi, a senior cleric freshly appointed to represent the Guardian Council.
Yet, the true levers of power have already shifted away from this civilian facade into the shadows. President Pezeshkian has been increasingly pushed to the background, reportedly stating publicly, “I am a doctor, not a politician”. Instead, the de facto management of state affairs has been handed to Ali Larijani, Iran’s top national security official and a deeply trusted former aide to Khamenei. Larijani coordinated everything from domestic protest suppression to diplomacy and military strategy, highlighting a historical reality of the Iranian Republic: moments of severe succession crisis invariably consolidate power within conservative, security-driven factions.
The Succession Crisis
The Assembly of Experts is legally bound to choose the next Supreme Leader “as soon as possible,” a monumental task they have successfully navigated only once, in 1989. However, the regime’s meticulous succession planning has been severely derailed by recent geopolitical shocks. The sudden death of hardline President Ebrahim Raisi in a May 2024 helicopter crash, coupled with the targeted assassinations of highly charismatic regional figures like Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani and Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah, has drastically narrowed the pool of unifying, consensus-building candidates.
This vacuum has catapulted Mojtaba Khamenei, 56, to the forefront of the succession debate. Mojtaba wields immense, behind-the-scenes influence, bolstered by deep ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij paramilitary force. But his elevation presents a profound ideological contradiction. The 1979 Islamic Revolution was explicitly fought to overthrow the dynastic rule of the US-backed Pahlavi monarchy; installing the son of the Supreme Leader risks sparking immense backlash among both the reformist public and the traditional Shiite clerical establishment, who view hereditary succession as fundamentally un-Islamic.
Despite this taboo, some analysts suggest that Mojtaba could represent a radical, yet potentially necessary, pivot for regime survival. If selected, he might pursue a strategy centred on consolidating power through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) while cautiously recalibrating the regime’s domestic and economic policies. By relying on the security establishment to maintain a firm authoritarian grip, a younger leader like Mojtaba could simultaneously attempt to soften certain rigid social doctrines, ease restrictions on women, and explore limited economic re-engagement with the West to stabilise a spiralling, heavily sanctioned economy. Such a shift would amount to a calculated compromise: sacrificing elements of ideological orthodoxy in exchange for institutional continuity and systemic survival.
If the Assembly balks at a dynastic succession, they may turn to Ayatollah Alireza Arafi. As a 67-year-old member of the interim council and head of Iran’s nationwide seminary system, Arafi is a bureaucratic heavyweight. Tech-savvy, widely published, and fluent in both English and Arabic, he represents a pragmatic choice, though he notably lacks the deep security ties necessary to command the military establishment effortlessly.
On the darker end of the spectrum is Mohammad Mehdi Mirbagheri, an ultra-hardline cleric who recently justified mass civilian casualties by shockingly claiming that the death of half the world’s population is “worth it” if it achieves closeness to God. Elevating a figure like Mirbagheri would signal Tehran’s intent to double down on an apocalyptic confrontation with the West. Conversely, moderate figures like Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of the revolution’s founder, possess immense symbolic legitimacy but have been systematically marginalised by the hardliners and hold virtually no sway over the military elite, making him an unlikely saviour.
A Vulnerable Regime with No Clear Alternative
As the clerical elite deliberate behind closed doors, external pressures are mounting at an unprecedented scale. US President Donald Trump has explicitly called for regime change, urging Iranians to seize this moment as their “only chance for generations” to overthrow their government. Exiled opposition figures, including Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi and Maryam Rajavi of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, have swiftly presented themselves as democratic alternatives, urging the IRGC to defect and the public to rise. Pahlavi has even controversially framed the devastating US-Israeli strikes as a “humanitarian intervention” aimed at freeing the Iranian people.
However, hoping for the government’s downfall does not instantly produce a capable democratic replacement. Iran currently lacks a structured, armed internal opposition comparable to the rebel forces in Syria or the organised anti-apartheid movement in South Africa. Even with millions of dissatisfied citizens, Iran lacks an internal leadership or institutional framework capable of assuming power. Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of Iran’s last shah, has long tried to present himself as an alternative, but his influence remains largely symbolic and external.
Therefore, the true arbiter of Iran’s future will not be the exiled opposition, but the IRGC. Despite Israel claiming to have killed most of its senior military leaders, including armed forces chief Abdolrahim Mousavi and IRGC commander Mohammad Pakpour, the IRGC retains between 150,000 and 190,000 troops and vast economic monopolies. The Guards will undoubtedly act as the ultimate kingmaker in this transition, ensuring that whoever dons the mantle of Supreme Leader will fiercely protect their financial and military interests.
As scholar Narges Bajoghli aptly noted, the Islamic Republic was built for survival, not for popularity. As the smoke clears over Tehran, the world watches a wounded, yet deeply entrenched theocracy, attempting to recalibrate its internal power structure under extraordinary pressure. Whether the outcome takes the form of pragmatic authoritarian consolidation or a turn toward uncompromising ideological hardline rule, the deliberations of the Assembly of Experts will affect not only Iran’s political trajectory but also the broader balance of power in the Middle East.
In the days ahead, three indicators will determine the trajectory of this crisis: the unity (or fragmentation) of the IRGC command structure; levels of public support to the war effort; and the response of regional proxies, particularly Hezbollah, whose own leadership decimation may limit its ability to project power or retaliate on Iran’s behalf. Each of these factors will shape not only who emerges as Supreme Leader, but whether that leader governs from a position of strength or from within an increasingly fractured and vulnerable state.
Yet, even as various candidates are floated behind closed doors, the central question confronting Tehran is not simply one of succession. For the Islamic Republic, the more immediate and existential imperative is to secure a viable exit from the current war while ensuring regime continuity amid external military pressure and internal fragility. Any new Supreme Leader will inherit a state grappling with damaged command structures, economic exhaustion, regional escalation, and explicit foreign calls for regime change. Leadership, under these conditions, is not merely a matter of clerical legitimacy or factional alignment; it is a test of strategic survival.
Moreover, the very individuals being considered for succession are themselves potential targets within an ongoing confrontation in which decapitation strikes have become an overt instrument of policy. The next leader of Iran will therefore assume office not from a position of consolidation, but from within a theatre of conflict in which personal security, institutional cohesion, and geopolitical deterrence are intertwined. In this volatile context, the future of the Islamic Republic will be determined less by ideological preference than by whether its new leadership can prevent further escalation, stabilise the state, and preserve its continuity amid unprecedented regional turbulence.
