The war in Ukraine is not only fought on land but also at sea, where control of shipping routes through the Black Sea has become vital to Kyiv’s survival and to global food security. Grain, metals, and container exports from Odesa and the Danube corridor are Ukraine’s economic lifeline, yet they remain vulnerable to mines, blockades, and fluctuating security guarantees. While outside powers debate naval deployments, the real solution lies closer to shore. A littoral-led framework, anchored by Türkiye and grounded in international law, offers a workable and credible path to keep trade moving, reduce escalation risks, and provide stability in one of the world’s most contested waterways.
Ukraine’s sea lifeline
Ukraine’s economy and war effort hinge on stable exports from Odesa and the Danube corridor. This demands routine mine clearance, reliable protection and insurance — not intermittent shows of force. Ankara is well placed to operationalise President Volodymyr Zelensky’s call for bespoke maritime guarantees. It has the necessary naval capability, regional legitimacy and daily familiarity with the waters to keep traffic moving without escalation. Ukrainian President Zelensky lauded Türkiye’s approach, which expressed its readiness to join the security guarantees specifically in the Black Sea.
A trilateral mine-countermeasure task group — with Romania and Bulgaria — already exists and can scale up, turning promises into lower operational risk for shipowners, underwriters and port operators. Grain, metals and container shipments need steady, local guardianship — a quiet presence, timely coordination and prompt repairs — rather than distant armadas whose mere presence drives up insurance costs.
Why Ankara is a suitable option
For Türkiye, Black Sea security is a matter of strategic depth. The Black Sea forms the gateway to the Turkish Straits, a crucial choke point for global trade and a corridor for energy, telecommunications and subsea infrastructure. Keeping it stable supports Türkiye’s economy, keeps war-risk insurance rates down and reduces the chance of a spill-over crisis that would force hard choices from the Aegean to the Levant. It also enforces the Montreux Convention, capping naval inflow and deterring a destabilising arms race.
Given that two European Union members are positioned in the Black Sea region, the EU has announced a new Black Sea strategy, which promises a Maritime Security Hub and enhanced connectivity. However, this strategy risks falling short without funding and a credible plan to strategically include Türkiye. Brussels must treat Ankara as a genuine partner, in a region where only Türkiye has the naval weight and legal authority to shape outcomes.
A Turkish-led operational regime can complement Europe’s growing interest in Black Sea stability without diluting regional control. The natural division of labour is for Ankara to carry out the close-in, routine work, while European partners quietly contribute through background coordination, targeted resilience projects and selective risk-reduction measures. In Türkiye’s case, NATO membership and regional stewardship complement each other — forming the bridge that makes this approach practical.
The legal‑political hinge
The Montreux agreement is not a footnote; it is the enabling mechanism. It limits tonnage and duration for non‑littoral navies and gives Türkiye authority over the Straits in wartime. Any scheme that sidelines these constraints invites escalation risk and insurance uncertainty. A Turkish‑centred approach, by contrast, works with a rule set understood by all actors. That predictability is exactly what shipowners, coastal communities, and underwriters need in a crowded, mined sea.
Moscow’s calculus
Russia doesn’t have to like the arrangement to live with it. For years Moscow has preferred littoral, law-based mechanisms over heavy overseas deployments near its shores. Türkiye’s enforcement of Montreux in 2022 — closing the Straits to warships — helped curb escalation while preserving trade and diplomatic ties. A security umbrella focused on mine clearance, safe-corridor management and infrastructure protection — not power projection — gives Moscow a face-saving, minimally escalatory option. For Moscow, if the aim is to keep trade moving without inviting a larger Western naval presence, a Turkish-led arrangement may not be ideal, but it is the most workable compromise.
What outsiders cannot deliver
Non-littoral navies bring impressive capabilities but encounter legal constraints and optics that can raise risk without guaranteeing security. They complicate insurance underwriting, alarm coastal populations and give Moscow a pretext to escalate. A littoral-led regime headed by Türkiye avoids these pitfalls. It blends NATO credibility with regional custodianship, proven mediation and operational proximity. It can convene partners, pool intelligence and align with EU initiatives — all within a framework that all sides accept.
A measured Turkish posture
In practice, a Turkish-centred framework would build on existing mine-countermeasure cooperation with Romania and Bulgaria, gradually expanding safe routes and improving hazard reporting for shippers and insurers. Over time, improved information sharing and basic deconfliction measures among littoral states could reinforce this steady, rules-based guardianship — avoiding drama while keeping the sea open for commerce.
This approach requires persistence, disciplined communication and strict adherence to Montreux. Türkiye already brings the necessary mix of convening power, skilled seamanship and a defence-industrial base — from mine-clearance systems to unmanned platforms and corvettes — that can adapt to evolving threats at sea. It also keeps doors open to future arrangements once the guns fall silent. In a post-ceasefire routine, Turkish coordination would sit at the centre, with partners bolstering resilience and situational awareness as Ukrainian ports regain predictable access to global markets.
The strategic payoff
For Ukraine, a Turkish-centred mechanism would be the quickest way to secure reliable exports and provide much-needed economic breathing space as the fighting continues. For Türkiye, it would secure commerce, affirm sovereign responsibilities under the Straits regime and anchor regional leadership — all without unnecessary confrontation. For Russia, it offers a non-escalatory way to keep trade flowing legitimately while limiting extra-regional naval presence.
In a theatre where symbolism often supersedes substance, this littoral-led, law-anchored approach offers the opposite: practical security, predictable rules and a safer Black Sea.
