The events of October 7, 2023, and the subsequent Israel onslaught on Gaza had a spillover effect on the region. A key example is the Yemen-based Houthi movement, which gave an ultimatum to Israel to either stop its genocidal actions in Gaza or it will disrupt the Red Sea maritime trade heading to the Jewish State.
In response, the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) jointly struck Houthi-held positions on January 12, 2024, to deter them and force them to reverse their course of action.
The Houthis
The Houthis emerged on the historical stage as a rebel group rooted in Yemen’s Zaydi Shi’ite tradition. Playing a significant role in Yemen’s political and religious landscape, the Houthis have staged rebellions at various intervals over time, impacting the political equations in the region.
The Believer Youth Movement was founded by Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi in Saada in 1992. The group evolved into a political and armed force and was later rebranded as the Ansarullah movement in 2004 but known popularly as “the Houthis”. Given that this group is derived from the Zaydi sect of Shi’ism, it received since the 1990s strong support from Iran.
Following the start of the civil war in Yemen in 2014, the Houthis emerged as an implacable fighting force that commands significant regions. Thanks to the complicity of President Ali Abdullah Salih, they managed to control the capital, Sanaa. This situation provoked Riyadh, and soon afterwards, coalition forces led by Saudi Arabia entered into a war against the Houthis in March 2015.
The Iran-Houthi Nexus
Although Iran did not create the Houthi movement, Tehran bolstered its relations with the group through soft power, particularly religious schools, to integrate the group into its constellation of Shi’ite proxies. Later, it upscaled the group’s level in military and security affairs via the Lebanese group, Hezbollah.
The entrance of a Saudi-led coalition in a war against the Houthis in 2015, in turn, triggered further involvement from Tehran. Iran provided the Houthis with even greater military assistance, increasing the reliance of the group on Tehran for military hardware, training, and intelligence.
Iran’s game post-October 7
Rather than getting involved directly in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran prefers to act via regional proxies, such as the Hezbollah and the Houthis. Post-October 7, Iran has boosted its support for the Houthis since the conflict’s onset, empowering them to disrupt international maritime transportation.
In addition to a steady supply of missiles, drones and all sorts of ammunition, Iran is directly supporting the Houthis to gather intelligence on maritime objectives and help pinpoint targets via precise coordinates thanks to vessels, such as the Iranian cargo vessel Behshad and the Iranian frigate IRIS Alborz, which spent much time in the Red Sea up until recently.
The end game for Iran is to intimidate other regional powers, such as Israel and Saudi Arabia. Iran’s strategy is to expand its constellation of proxies and brand them as the “axis of resistance,” to win the hearts and minds of the people in the Middle East.
Iran is also weaving a web of relations on the African shores of the Red Sea. Tehran has multiplied its activities in Djibouti and Sudan, which could be precursors for future moves.
Enlargement of the Conflict
Following their ultimatum to stop the War on Gaza, the Houthis have engaged in bellicose activities against cargo chips. The US Administration tried to discourage the group from this course of action via diplomacy and statements. However, given the group’s refusal to comply, US/UK bombers attacked Houthi-held facilities on January 12.
Just a few days after the US attacks on Yemen, Iran launched airstrikes in Syria, Northern Iraq, and Pakistan, claiming they targeted ISIS. In one of these strikes, Iran targeted the home of a businessman accused of being a Mossad liaison in Iraq’s Kurdish Regional Government.
Winners and Losers
The first winner from the current escalation in the Red Sea is Iran. Tehran has managed to assert its importance on the international agenda while avoiding direct conflict and nurturing instability away from its borders. It is also making it hard for the US and Israel to ignore its demands, especially when it comes to the Iran nuclear deal.
Next on the winners’ list are the Houthis. This group could not achieve a decisive win in Yemen’s civil war, and, therefore, was not able to govern the country uncontestably. By giving an ultimatum to Israel to stop its war on Gaza, and opening fire on ships heading to Eilat, the Houthis became popular with Shiite and Sunni factions alike and are now a de-facto legitimate actor in Yemen.
Russia and China stand also among the primary beneficiaries from the escalation in the Red Sea. Their chips and trade routes remain largely unhindered unlike their Western rivals.
On the other hand, the failure of U.S.-led Operation Prosperity Guardian did not make a difference, and delivered a blow to the reputation of the US / UK coalition, as it finds itself unable to establish security in the Red Sea.
Europe is also affected by the Houthi attacks. It relies on the chokepoints of the Red Sea and Bab-al-Mandeb for most of its trade with Asia. The increasing chipping costs will hit the European economy hard.
Egypt stands to be also among the losers. The country faces an economic slowdown and relies upon the revenue from the Suez Canal. For the fiscal year 2022-23, the Suez Canal generated $9.4 billion in revenue for Cairo. However, in the first 11 days of 2024, earnings from the Suez Canal dropped by 40 percent compared to the same timeframe last year.
In sum, as Iran boosts its pan-regional influence via the Houthis, global and regional actors are faced with significant challenges, with broader implications for peace, security, and the balance of power in the strategically pivotal Red Sea corridor.
