In an intriguing sequence of diplomatic visits, Astana hosted French President Emmanuel Macron, who praised Kazakhstan for ‘resisting geopolitical pressures.’ Two weeks later, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Astana possibly to assuage any concerns.
Since its independence in 1991, Kazakhstan has been aligned with Russia. However, during President Tokayev’s tenure, Astana has taken some distance. While Russia remains a close ally, other pathways are explored.
Kazakhstan is at a critical juncture, moving away from the Soviet past. As a natural gas and oil-rich nation and the world’s largest exporter of uranium, providing 40% of global production, this Central Asian state has the potential to be a significant geopolitical player.
When I last visited Kazakhstan, transformation was underway. The rise of Kazakh nationalism was noticeable to the extent that citizens of Russian origin incorporated Kazakh words into their vernacular. They did so to distinguish themselves from the new Russian migrants coming to the country after Putin’s mobilisation announcement.
From this perspective, one can understand why Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev spoke in Kazakh language during Putin’s most recent visit. In October 2023, the Ministry of Culture announced initiatives to promote the use of the Kazakh language instead of Russian in the country’s media. Ironically, President Tokayev had declared the year 2023 as the Year of the Russian Language for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries.
This dilemma illustrates how Kazakh leadership must balance economic and security interests with nascent cultural and identitarian issues.
The War in Ukraine played a big role in Kazakhstan’s shift. When the war started, Astana maintained a neutral stance, adopting the UN line regarding the conflict in Ukraine, and rejecting Russia’s request to send troops to Ukraine. Meanwhile, pro-Ukraine rallies were held in cities across Kazakhstan. Additionally, President Tokayev declared during a press conference with Putin that Kazakhstan does not recognise Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states.
Kazakhstan’s stance irritated the Kremlin. Putin made a veiled threat, recalling the historical borders of the Soviet Union. Later, Ramzan Kadyrov, the President of the Chechen Republic, criticised the Kazakh government in a video. Then, former President Dmitry Medvedev’s social media account criticised Astana, referring to a part of Kazakhstan’s territory as Russian and suggesting Russia’s right to it. Medvedev later claimed his account was hacked.
Then, in early July 2022, a court in Russia ordered the suspension of operations of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which exports 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil, for 30 days. The reason cited for the suspension was environmental violations. This was the third time Russia disrupted the energy flow since the start of the Ukraine war.
Because of mutual interdependencies, relations did not reach their nadir. Kazakhstan, the world’s leading uranium producer, counts Russia as one of its major customers, and Russia is in the top three countries doing commerce with Kazakhstan.
In addition, despite Kazakhstan suspending the export of 106 types of goods to Russia as part of the international embargo, the country’s exports have increased by approximately $1 billion compared to the same period last year, according to the data from the National Statistical Office of Kazakhstan. Furthermore, President Tokayev maintained his balancing act by seeking assistance from the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) during the protests in January 2022.
Conversely, Kazakh public opinion has significant security concerns towards Russia. The hostile declarations by Russian politicians regarding Kazakh territories and the collective sympathy towards Ukraine, coupled with the massive wave of migration to Kazakhstan following Putin’s partial mobilisation announcement on September 21, 2022, have fuelled these concerns. In the first two weeks after the mobilisation announcement, approximately 1 million Russians migrated to Kazakhstan.
As part of a study I conducted in May 2023, I explored local perceptions towards Russian immigrants in Kazakhstan on Twitter. Even though Russian ethnic citizens constitute 16% of the country’s population, negative perceptions towards these immigrants prevail.
The regional dynamics are creating shifts and re-alignments, luring other international players.
Following the military coup in Niger in July 2023, France lost its second-largest uranium market. Therefore, Macron’s interest in Kazakhstan increased. In July 2023, authorities officially requested the expulsion of Mukhtar Ablyazov, a banker and politician who sought political asylum in France in 2017. While Kazakh authorities sought his extradition for corruption since Nazarbayev’s era, it finally achieved its goal after Tokayev visited Paris and signed important trade agreements, paving the way for more collaboration in cultural and educational fields.
China is another significant player in the region. Beijing’s involvement started with the launch of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Against this backdrop, China has funded over 100 projects in Kazakhstan, and the trade volume between the two countries exceeded $31 billion in 2022. In addition, a visa exemption came into effect in October, fostering people-to-people connections and cultural exchanges.
It is important to evaluate Kazakhstan’s proximity to China from a cultural perspective. During the Soviet era, official history education taught that if Kazakhstan were not part of the Soviet Union, it would be a colony of China.
The United States’ influence in the region is less impactful than that of China or France, and Washington has enough on its plate elsewhere. During his visit to Astana in February for the C5+1 format, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken emphasised the importance of bilateral relations and announced a commitment to providing a meagre $25 million in funding to the five partners in Central Asia. But things could change quickly as Kazakhstan’s international standing increases and think tanks scrutinise its future trajectory.
Astana’s strengthening of relations with members of the Organization of Turkic States has also drawn international attention. In early November 2023, it hosted the summit of this organisation, whereby President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan proposed a common alphabet to member countries. This proposal was timely as it reinforced the long-debated transition to the Latin alphabet, which has been on Kazakhstan’s agenda for a long time.
By re-aligning and re-calibrating its foreign policy and cultural orientations, the Kazakh leadership aims to have a wider spectrum of foreign policy options. While Russian officials are not pleased with this development, they must look in the mirror for this one, as the reverberations of Moscow’s Ukraine war grow louder not just on the battlefields in Ukraine but also deep in Central Asia.
