Since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, Israel’s unlawful policy of expansion and occupation in Syria has entered a new and dangerous phase. This time it’s playing out in the country’s south and reaching Damascus. The latest episode of escalation in Suwayda, where internal clashes between local Bedouin tribes and a secessionist Druze faction drew a response from the Syrian army to restore order. But what followed marked a serious escalation as Israeli airstrikes targeted key military sites in Damascus, including the Ministry of Defence and General Staff buildings, striking perilously near the presidential complex.
These strikes are not isolated incidents. They are part of an eight-month Israeli campaign aimed at destabilising Syria to the point of state collapse. This strategy risks dragging the region deeper into chaos and undermining already fragile hopes for peace. As media scholar Mohamad Elmasry put it in an interview with Al Jazeera, “They are basically telling Syria to withdraw from Syria.” At home, this expansionist agenda doubles as a political survival tactic for Prime Minister Netanyahu. Now cornered domestically, pressured by internal dissent and reduced to a minority in the Knesset, Netanyahu seems to be fuelling the war machine in a last-ditch effort to remain in power.
Regional implications
Israel’s latest wave of aggression in Syria isn’t just a string of military actions. It is a window into a much broader regional vision. Long before October 7, Israel’s approach was rooted in timeworn doctrines like forward defence, strategic deterrence, and the brutal logic of “mowing the lawn.” But in the aftermath of the October 7 shock, that strategy has evolved, or rather, morphed, into something far more radical: a push for full-spectrum control that leaves little room for compromise or negotiation.
Nowhere is this shift more evident than in Syria. Since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, Israel has been pursuing a campaign that began with the de facto annexation of territory around the Golan Heights, in blatant violation of the 1974 Disengagement Agreement.
It has since evolved into a more political form of fragmentation, exploiting tensions in the south, particularly among Druze communities in provinces such as Suwayda. By branding select Druze factions as “strategic partners,” Israel seems determined to fragment Syria into a patchwork of enclaves ruled by warlords and militia strongmen. This calculated manoeuvre aims to further destabilise Damascus—under President Al Sharaa’s leadership—and reduce the country to a shattered mosaic of rival fiefdoms, eroding national sovereignty and entrenching chaos.
This is no longer a strategy of deterrence—it is a deliberate campaign to pre-emptively reshape the region according to Israel’s maximalist ambitions. Just as with the 12-day war, launched at a critical moment when the U.S. and Iran were nearing nuclear negotiations, Israel’s latest strikes in Syria appear aimed at undermining a nascent government emerging from decades of authoritarian rule—one that has pledged equal rights for all minorities under a unified central authority. Israel, it seems, is intent on derailing this fragile transition before it can take root.
As it wages a bloody and increasingly indefensible genocidal war in Gaza, Israel has stopped bothering with international justification. Yet in Syria, it still cloaks its actions in the rhetoric of “protecting Druze communities”—a claim that rings hollow. According to reports by Axios, even U.S. intelligence officials admit there is no clear evidence of Syrian government involvement in the Suwayda clashes targeting some civilians.
The reality is more calculated. Israel is constructing its narrative around a marginal Druze faction tied to clerical figures like Hikmat al-Hijri, while sidelining the broader Druze population that largely supports the state’s law-and-order framework and poses no threat. By elevating this fringe opposition, Israel seeks to delegitimise and destabilise a central government that has clearly pledged non-aggression—turning a local grievance into a geopolitical tool.
And if Syria unravels under the weight of these engineered crises, so much the better for Israel. The resulting image of a “failed state” will not only weaken a once-formidable neighbour but also help justify Israel’s expansive new security doctrine, one that no longer stops at the border, but actively reshapes what lies beyond in line with what it perceives as a threat-to-be.
Netanyahu’s domestic game
As Israel presses ahead with its full-spectrum strategy of regional expansion and control, domestic politics is also affected by these developments and weighs them as well.
For Prime Minister Netanyahu, who knows all too well that U.S. policy in the Middle East, solidified by the Carter Doctrine, has traditionally prioritised Israel’s security above all else, the current moment is more than a challenge. It’s a golden opportunity. With Washington’s enduring commitment to Israel’s regional dominance, and with every American president treating the “Israel file” as a top foreign policy priority, Netanyahu sees room to manoeuvre even as his political base at home continues to erode.
The cracks in his ruling coalition are widening. Ultra-Orthodox parties like Shas and United Torah Judaism have pulled out over the government’s failure to pass legislation exempting religious students from military service. The parliamentary arithmetic in the Knesset now leaves Netanyahu with only 50 out of 120 seats, which is a precarious minority. While reports suggest these departing parties won’t back a no-confidence vote, Netanyahu is nonetheless walking a political tightrope.
In such fragile circumstances, it’s no surprise the Israeli PM is trying to stretch the “rally round the flag” effect, famously outlined by William D. Baker and John R. Oneal in their 2001 article. By keeping the nation in a state of perpetual confrontation, Netanyahu hopes to turn external conflict into domestic cohesion. Even amid talks of a possible U.S.-brokered ceasefire with Hamas, Netanyahu appears poised to maintain his aggressive expansionist posture, likely betting that any pause in fighting will be short-lived once hostages are returned.
The same pattern extends to Syria. Although a truce has reportedly been reached between Damascus and the Druze communities, and although the secessionist Druze faction led by Hikmat al-Hijri appears significantly weakened in terms of its ability to restart any fight with the central government soon, Israel continues to zero in on fragmented communities as part of its wider destabilisation campaign.
In this context, recent remarks by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan carry notable weight. Referring to growing activity by the YPG, Fidan warned: “We’re receiving reports of certain movements. Our message to them is: Don’t even think about it. Don’t exploit the current instability in Syria. Don’t take actions that could worsen an already critical and delicate process. Play a constructive role—or risk facing serious consequences.”
It doesn’t take much reading between the lines to see that this was more than a general warning. It was a thinly veiled message directed at Netanyahu. In a region where fractures are deepening and alliances shifting, Ankara is signalling that it won’t sit idly by while Israel fans the flames of division in Syria.
The way ahead
Israel’s recent moves in Suwayda and Damascus reflect two converging realities: the transformation of its defence doctrine in the aftermath of October 7, and Prime Minister Netanyahu’s increasingly desperate bid for political survival.
For Netanyahu, who is internationally marginalised, under the shadow of arrest warrants, and rapidly losing credibility, the challenge of steering a minority government through wartime is akin to walking a tightrope. Managing a war cabinet while clinging to power at home is no small feat, especially when your legitimacy is hanging by a thread.
So, is domestic politics driving Israel’s regional aggression—or simply reacting to it? The answer is both. However, what has become increasingly clear is that it’s Israel’s evolving security doctrine—not Netanyahu’s political survival—that’s setting the tone. Domestic and regional dynamics may be intertwined, but the real engine here is a security paradigm that has shifted from deterrence to dominance, reshaping Israel’s posture in the region and beyond. Recently, we have seen the episodes from Gaza, Lebanon, Iran, and Syria. So, what’s next?
